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I. INTRODUCTION
Empirical research has become a central focus of the policy debate over
consumer and employment arbitration. The congressional hearings on the
proposed Arbitration Fairness Act' (Act) are replete with empirical assertions
about the conduct of consumer and employment arbitrations. 2 Both
* John M. Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law.
** Research Associate, Searle Civil Justice Institute, Northwestern University School
of Law. This Article is part of a broader research project and is taken from a Preliminary
Report issued by the Consumer Arbitration Task Force, Searle Civil Justice Institute
(SCJI), entitled Consumer Arbitration Before the American Arbitration Association (Mar.
2009). Thanks to the SCJI and the University of Kansas for financial and other support
for this project. We are exceedingly grateful to the American Arbitration Association,
especially Bill Slate, Richard Naimark, Ryan Boyle, and Gerry Strathmann, for providing
access to the data and other assistance. We appreciate insightful comments on prior drafts
from Lisa Bingham, Geoff Miller, Bo Rutledge, Jason Johnston, Jiro Kondo, and Max
Schanzenbach, as well as members of the Searle Board of Overseers and participants in
the Searle Center spring research retreat. Henry Butler, Geoff Lysaught, and Judy Pendell
also provided helpful comments on drafts, as well as support and oversight throughout
this project. Thanks also to Elise Nelson, Matthew Sibery, Jonathan Hillel, and A.J.
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1 Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009) (making predispute
arbitration agreements unenforceable if they require arbitration of any "employment,
consumer, or franchise dispute," or "a dispute arising under any statute intended to
protect civil rights"); see also Consumer Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 991, 111th Cong. § 2
(2009) (making predispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts unenforceable
and "an unfair and deceptive trade act or practice"); Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 4208(a) (2009) ("The Director, by
regulation, may prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of any agreement
between a covered person and a consumer for a consumer financial product or service
providing for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties if the Director finds
that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or limitations are in the public interest
and for the protection of consumers."). ,
2 See The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the
Constitution Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings]; The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R.
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supporters and opponents of the proposed Act raised empirical issues and
analyzed empirical studies in their testimony before Congress, on topics such
as the cost of arbitration, 3 the speed of the process, 4 and the outcomes for
consumers and employees.5 Indeed, the disagreement over the state of the
empirical record has continued outside of the congressional forum,6 with
both sides recognizing the importance of relying on sound empirical research
rather than anecdotal evidence.7 Professor Peter B. Rutledge concludes,
3010 Before the Commercial and Admin. Law Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter House Hearings]. For hearings in which the
report underlying this article is discussed, see Hearing on Arbitration or Arbitrary: The
Misuse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Consumer Debts, Subcomm. on Domestic
Policy, House Oversight Comm., 111th Cong. (2009); Hearing on the Federal
Arbitration Act: Is the Credit Card Industry Using It to Quash Legal Claims?, Subcomm.
on Commercial and Admin. Law, House Comm. on the Judiciary, I 1Ith Cong. (2009).
3 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 4 (Statement of Sen. Sam Brownback); Senate
Hearings, supra note 2, at 2 (Statement of Sen. Russell Feingold).
4 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 8 (Statement of Professor Peter B. Rutledge).
5 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 17-18 (Statement of F. Paul Bland, Jr.); Senate
Hearings, supra note 2, at 15 (Statement of Mark A. de Bernardo); Senate Hearings,
supra note 2, at 4 (Statement of Sen. Sam Brownback); Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at
26 (Testimony of Tanya Solov); House Hearings, supra note 2, at 18 (Testimony of
Laura MacCleery).
6 In particular, see the exchange between Public Citizen and Professor Peter B.
Rutledge. Compare PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP: How OPPONENTS
OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY DISTORT THE DEBATE ON ARBITRATION (2008),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationDebateTrap(Final).pdf
[hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP] and JOHN O'DONNELL, ET AL.,
PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: How CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE
CONSUMERS (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/-
ArbitrationTrap.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION TRAP] with PETER B.
RUTLEDGE, U.S. CHAMBER INST. LEGAL REFORM, ARBITRATION-A GOOD DEAL FOR
CONSUMERS: A RESPONSE TO PUBLIC CITIZEN 1 (2008), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/docload.cfn?docld= 1091 [hereinafter
RUTLEDGE, GOOD DEAL]. See also Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L.
PUB. POL'Y 549 (2008); [hereinafter Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?]; Peter B. Rutledge,
Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 271-78 (2008).
7 See Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, supra note 6, at 589 (concluding that
"[i]ncreased congressional attention" to consumer and employment arbitration "can be
valuable, for it promotes discussion and study about this valuable dispute-resolution tool"
but also "can be dangerous if the terms of the debate focus too much on anecdote and too
little on systematic study"); PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 6,
at 2 ("Rutledge concludes Whither with the warning that congressional scrutiny of
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although perhaps overoptimistically, that "there now appears to be a
consensus that the future of arbitration should be decided by data, not
anecdote."8
But despite the importance of systematic empirical evidence to Congress
and other policymakers when they consider consumer and employment
arbitration, the available empirical evidence is limited in important respects.
A number of studies have analyzed employment arbitration (particularly as
administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA)) and securities
arbitration.9 But few studies have examined consumer arbitration in any
detail.1o
This article extends our knowledge of consumer arbitration by presenting
results from the first detailed empirical study of consumer arbitration as
administered by the AAA. Primarily using a sample of 301 AAA consumer
arbitrations that resulted in an award between April and December 2007, it
considers such issues as the costs incurred by consumers in arbitration, the
speed of the arbitral process, and the outcomes of the cases-the very topics
of most interest in the policy debate.
Our central findings are the following:
* In cases with claims seeking less than $10,000, consumer claimants
paid an average of $96 ($1 administrative fees + $95 arbitrator fees).
This amount increases to $219 ($15 administrative fees + $204
arbitrator fees) for claims between $10,000 and $75,000. These
amounts fall below levels specified in the AAA fee schedule for low-
cost arbitrations, and are a result of arbitrators reallocating consumer
costs to businesses.
* The average time from filing to final award for the consumer
arbitrations studied was 6.9 months. Cases with business claimants
were resolved on average in 6.6 months and cases with consumer
claimants were resolved on average in 7.0 months.
* Consumers won some relief in 53.3% of the cases they filed and
arbitration 'can be dangerous if the terms of the debate focus too much on anecdote and
too little on systematic study.' We agree.").
8 Peter B. Rutledge, Common Ground in the Arbitration Debate, I Y.B. ARB. &
MED. 1, 8 (2009) (emphasis omitted); see also Peter B. Rutledge, The Case Against the
Arbitration Fairness Act, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 4, 4 (stating that "it now
appears to be common ground that the policy debate over the Arbitration Fairness Act
should focus on empirical data").
9 See infra App. 2.
I0 See infra App. 1.
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recovered an average of $19,255; business claimants won some relief
in 83.6% of their cases and recovered an average of $20,648.
* Arbitrators awarded attorneys' fees to prevailing consumer claimants
in 63.1% of cases in which the consumer sought such an award. In
those cases in which the award of attorneys' fees specified a dollar
amount, the average attorneys' fee award was $14,574.
* No statistically significant repeat-player effect was identified using a
traditional definition of repeat-player business. Utilizing an
alternative definition of repeat player, some evidence of a repeat-
player effect was identified; the data suggest this result may be due
to better case screening by repeat players rather than arbitrator bias
or other bias in favor of repeat players.
The focus on AAA consumer arbitration is both a benefit of and a
limitation on our study. The AAA is a well-known and widely-used provider
of arbitration services, for consumers and others. Our findings thus provide
insight into consumer arbitrations administered by an important provider of
such services. Conversely, our findings necessarily are limited to consumer
arbitrations administered by the AAA. Other arbitration providers may
administer cases differently. They may attract different types of cases and
different types of businesses. Accordingly, one cannot assume that our
results are representative of all consumer arbitrations, just as one cannot
assume that results from studies of other providers are representative of all
consumer arbitrations. To the extent policymakers are deciding whether and
how to regulate consumer arbitration, however, additional empirical
information on the consumer arbitration process will enable them to make
more informed decisions.
Another limitation of the study is that to evaluate the costs, speed, and
outcomes of consumer arbitrations, one must have a baseline for comparison;
data on arbitration proceedings alone are not enough. Accordingly, while this
article's findings provide a look into consumer arbitrations administered by
the AAA, further work remains to be done.'I
Part II of this article provides background on prior empirical studies of
consumer arbitration. Part III describes the AAA's consumer arbitration
rules. Part IV sets out the research questions we analyze and describes in
1 For an interim report comparing outcomes in debt collection arbitrations to
outcomes in debt collection cases in court, see SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CREDITOR
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detail our datasets and research methodologies. Part V presents our research
results on the costs, speed, and outcomes of AAA consumer arbitrations.
Finally, Part VI concludes by summarizing our central empirical findings and
highlighting implications of those findings for the empirical debate.
II. PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON CONSUMER ARBITRATION-COSTS,
SPEED, AND OUTCOMES
In this Part, we summarize the current empirical literature on consumer
arbitration.12 Because our focus is on consumer arbitration, with limited
exception, we do not discuss empirical studies on securities arbitration or
employment arbitration.13 Rather, we focus on studies of the arbitration
process itself, which address issues such as the cost, speed, and outcome of
the arbitration proceeding.14 To the extent those studies seek to compare
arbitration to litigation, we focus only on the arbitration portion of the study.
12 For a more detailed description of the empirical studies of consumer arbitration
discussed in this part, see infra App. 1.
13 For surveys of empirical research on consumer and employment arbitration, see
Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration:
What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1051 (2009); Sarah R. Cole & Theodore
H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer Arbitration, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2008, at
30, 31; Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity
Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 405, 412-37 (2007); Kirk D.
Jensen, Summaries of Empirical Studies and Surveys Regarding How Individuals Fare in
Arbitration, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 631 (2006); Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?,
supra note 6, at 556-89 (2008); David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher, & Michael Heise,
Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1563-78 (2005); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration
Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813
(2008) (surveying empirical studies of arbitration costs). For a list of empirical studies of
employment and securities arbitration, see App. 2. For an empirical study of franchise
arbitration and litigation outcomes, based on disclosures in franchise disclosure
documents, see Edward Wood Dunham & David Geronemus, Lessons from the
Resolution of Franchise Disputes, JAMS DIsP. RESOL. ALERT (JAMS, Irvine, CA,
Summer 2003), available at http://www.wiggin.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/JAMS%20article
%20J%2ODunham.pdf.
14 We do not consider studies of the provisions of consumer or employment
arbitration clauses, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to
Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience,
67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 73-74 (2004), Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller,
& Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871 (2008);
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A. Costs
Commentators express conflicting views about the costs of arbitration. A
commonly stated view is that arbitration is cheaper than litigation.' 5
Arbitration often is less formal than litigation, with less discovery and less
motions practice. 16 Arbitration awards are subject to limited court review,
which may reduce the likelihood of a challenge to an award. 7 On this view,
the costs of arbitrating a dispute may be lower than the costs of litigating a
comparable dispute. If so, arbitration may be a more accessible forum for
consumers to resolve disputes.18
An alternative view is that arbitration is too expensive-that the high
costs of arbitration preclude consumers from bringing claims.1 9 A report
studies of outcomes of court cases involving challenges to arbitration agreements, e.g.,
Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59 VAND. L.
REv. 729, 752-59 (2006); or studies of outcomes of court cases involving challenges to
arbitration awards, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King:. The Statutory
Arbitrator and the Demise ofJudicial Review, 2009 J. Disp. RESOL. 1.
15 153 CONG. REc. S4614 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 2007) (statement of Sen. Sessions)
("Arbitration is one of the most cost-effective means of resolving disputes."); Lewis L.
Maltby, The Myth of Second-Class Justice: Resolving Employment Disputes in
Arbitration, in How ADR WORKS 915, 926 (Norman Brand ed., 2002) ("The greatest
strength of arbitration is that the average person can afford it.").
16 Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DiSP. RESOL. 89,90.
17 Id
18 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995)
("[A]rbitration's advantages often would seem helpful to individuals, say, complaining
about a product, who need a less expensive alternative to litigation."); Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) ("Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid
the costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance in employment
litigation, which often involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning
commercial contracts.").
19 Press Release, Public Citizen, Arbitration More Expensive than Court-So Costly
that Many Victims of Consumer Fraud, Employment Discrimination Give Up (May 1,
2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/print release.cfm?ID=1098
(statement of Joan Claybrook) ("[F]or people who are victims of consumer rip-offs and
workplace injustices, arbitration costs much more than litigation-so much more that it
becomes impossible to vindicate your rights."); see also Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrator's
Fees: The Dagger in the Heart of Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory Discrimination
Claims, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 30 (2003); Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of
Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133, 161 (2004); Charles
L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 781 (2002).
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from Public Citizen issued in 2000 asserted that arbitration is substantially
more expensive than litigation, citing the need to pay the arbitrator and any
provider of administrative services.20 By comparison, parties do not pay
judges (except through their tax dollars) and pay a flat, low filing fee to file
suit in court.21 Under this view, the high upfront costs make arbitration a less
accessible forum for consumers. 22
Most of the empirical evidence on arbitration costs addresses the upfront
costs of arbitration and does not consider costs such as attorneys' fees,
internal expenses, and opportunity costs associated with resolving the dispute
itself 23 The Public Citizen report on the Costs of Arbitration presented a
series of case studies with an analysis of the costs of arbitrating and litigating
four hypothetical cases, in reaching its conclusion that arbitration costs "have
a deterrent effect, often preventing a claimant from even filing a case." 24
By comparison, Mark Fellows reported that consumer claimants in
National Arbitration Forum (NAF) arbitrations in 2003-2004 paid arbitration
fees averaging $46.63 while business claimants paid arbitration fees
averaging $149.50.25 Similarly, Navigant Consulting, relying on NAF data
2 0 E.g., JACKSON WILLIAMs, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 1 (2002)
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF110A.pdf ("The cost to a plaintiff of
initiating an arbitration is almost always higher than the cost of instituting a lawsuit. Our
comparison of court fees to the fees charged by the three primary arbitration provider
organizations demonstrates that forum costs-the costs charged by the tribunal that will
decide the dispute-can be up to five thousand percent higher in arbitration than in court
litigation.") (emphasis in original).
21 Drahozal, supra note 14, at 736-37.
22 For a possible reconciliation of these competing views about arbitration costs, see
id. at 734-35.
23 For empirical evidence on business cost savings from arbitration (including
attorneys' fees in handling the cases), see the studies discussed in Drahozal, supra note
13, at 829-30; see also Herbert M. Kritzer & Jill K. Anderson, The Arbitration
Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of Case Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and
Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the Courts, 8 JUST. SYs. J. 6, 17 (1983)
(studying fees received by attorneys in sample of AAA commercial arbitrations and
uninsured motorist arbitrations, state court cases, and federal court cases: "The AAA is
least expensive for small cases, and most expensive for the remaining three
categories.... At the same time, in a sense, one gets 'more' for the money in terms of the
amount of institutional processing, with the AAA, because a much larger proportion of
cases go through the 'complete process,' including a hearing and an award.").
24 WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 1, 6-51.
25 Mark Fellows, The Same Result as in Court, More Efficiently: Comparing
Arbitration and Court Litigation Outcomes, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, July 2006, at 32.
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from January 2003 through March 2007, concluded that consumers paid no
fee in 99.3% of the cases (presumably those brought by businesses) and a
median fee of $75 in the remaining 246 cases.26 Ernst & Young reported in
2004 that the average fee paid in consumer "banking" arbitrations
administered by the AAA was $1935, but the data were incomplete as to how
the fees were allocated between consumers and businesses. 27 A study by the
California Dispute Resolution Institute (CDRI), looking at data disclosed by
six arbitration providers from January 2003 to February 2004, found a mean
arbitration fee of $2256 and a median arbitration fee of $870.28 But the data
used by the CDRI were incomplete, did not separate out the fees paid by
consumers from the fees paid by businesses, 29 and included both consumer
and employment cases. 30
B. Speed
Arbitration also is commonly perceived to be a faster dispute resolution
process than litigation. 31 The reasons are at least twofold. First, again,
arbitration is less formal than litigation, with less discovery and fewer
26 Memorandum from Jeff Nielsen et al. re: National Arbitration Forum: California
Consumer Arbitration Data 3 (July 18, 2003), available at http://www.
instituteforlegalreform.com/get ilr doc.php?docld=1212.
27 ERNST & YOUNG, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
CONSUMER LENDING CASES 16-17, App. A (2004), available at http://www.adrforum
.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2005ErnstandYoung.pdf.
28 CAL. DIsP. RESOL. INST., CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN
CALIFORNIA: A REvIEW OF WEBSITE DATA POSTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 1281.96 OF
THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 21 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.mediate.
com/cdri/cdriprint aug_6.pdf. The six providers were the AAA, ADR Services,
Arbitration Works, ARC Consumer Arbitrations, JAMS, and Judicate West. Id. at 14.
29 Id. at 18 ("In general, inconsistencies, ambiguities and the lack of reported
data ... limit this study's utility for the purposes of informing policy. . . ."); see also
Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Conference Presentation at the ABA Section of Dispute
Resolution Conference, Los Angeles, CA: Arbitration Data Disclosure in California:
What We Have and What We Need 20 (Apr. 15, 2005) (concluding that "the private
arbitration service providers in question are not providing the information that is critical
to an analysis of how the consumer party fare[s] in commercial arbitration").
30 CALIFORNIA DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., supra note 28, at 17, 22 fig.1.
31 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 97-542, at 13 (1982) ("'The advantages of arbitration are many: it is usually
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motions, and appellate review of awards is limited.32 Second, arbitration may
have less of a queue than litigation-parties can choose an arbitrator who
does not have a backlog of cases, so that they can avoid waiting behind other
parties to have their dispute resolved.33
The empirical evidence shows consumer arbitration to be an expeditious
process.34 In 2007, the AAA reported that, on average, its consumer cases
took four months to resolve on the basis of documents and six months to
resolve on the basis of in-person hearings.35 For 2006, the numbers were
similar: an average of 3.8 months for document-only cases and 7.4 months
for cases decided after in-person hearings. 36 Mark Fellows found that the
NAF's average disposition time from 2003 to 2004 for consumer claimants
was 4.35 months and for business claimants was 5.60 months.37 The CDRI
study of six arbitration providers from January 2003 to February 2004 found
a mean disposition time of 116 days and a median disposition time of 104
days, 38 although as noted above, the data are incomplete and problematic.39
32 See id.
33 Richard A. Posner, The Cost of Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern
Europe-And for the United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1, 15 (1996) ("The longer the queue,
the greater the incentive of the parties to a dispute to substitute arbitration or other
nonjudicial methods of dispute resolution for the courts .... ); Hon. Diane P. Wood,
Snapshots from the Seventh Circuit: Continuity and Change, 1966-2007, 2008 Wis. L.
REV. 1, 6 (stating that "to the extent that litigants wish to avoid these queues, they are
opting out of the judicial system altogether and turning to arbitration and mediation.").
34 See Kritzer & Anderson, supra note 23, at 17 (finding that "the American
Arbitration Association offers the possibility of relatively fast adjudication (compared to
relatively slow nonadjudication in the courts).").
35 AM. ARB. Ass'N, ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION'S
CONSUMER ARBITRATION CASELOAD: BASED ON CONSUMER CASES AWARDED BETWEEN
JANUARY AND AUGUST 2007 (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5027
[hereinafter AAA, 2007 Caseload Analysis].
36 Statement of the American Arbitration Association, Annex D, in The Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the Constitution Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 135 (2007) [hereinafter AAA, 2006
Caseload Analysis].
7 Fellows, supra note 25, at 32.
38 CALIFORNIA DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., supra note 28, at 19. Actually, in
comparison to other variables in the study, the CDRI data on time of disposition is more
complete, covering 1559 of 2175 cases. Id.
39 See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
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C. Outcomes
An important subject of empirical research is how consumers fare in
arbitration. Several ways to measure outcomes have been used, including the
win rate, the amount of damages recovered, and the amount of damages
recovered as a percentage of the amount claimed. Two points of particular
interest are how arbitration outcomes compare to outcomes in court, which is
beyond the scope of this Article, and whether outcomes are biased in favor of
repeat players.
Win rates. Studies have most commonly looked at the win rate in
arbitration, defined as the percentage of cases won by the consumer or the
business. But the absolute win rate itself is not a particularly meaningful
number. Instead, the absolute win rate must be compared to a baseline. Some
commentators have focused on fifty percent as that baseline.40 Others have
suggested that an extremely high business win rate shows a process that is
unfair to consumers. 4 1 Neither view is necessarily correct.
At least two possible approaches are available for identifying a proper
baseline for comparison. One possible approach is to use a theoretical model
of case settlement, which generates predictions about expected outcomes.42
Some models lead to predictions of a fifty percent win rate, providing some
support for using that figure as a baseline.43 Other models, based on different
40 Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, supra note 6, at 559 n.36 (stating that "the only
reported data showing a win-rate of less than 50% is William Howard's study of
securities arbitration"); PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 6,
at 16 ("In fact, at least five other studies have found win rates of less than 50 percent for
individual claimants. . . .").
41 PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION TRAP, supra note 6, at 13 (referring to the "truly
staggering success rate" of businesses in NAF arbitrations); Letter from Professors of
Consumer Law and Banking Law to Senators Dodd and Shelby and Congressmen Frank
and Bachus, Statement in Support of Legislation Creating a Consumer Financial
Protection Agency 6 (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf
/Media/consumer-law/209-28-09.pdf ("Studies have found the arbitrators find for
companies against consumers 94 to 96% of the time, suggesting that arbitration providers
are responding to the incentive to find for those who select them: the companies that
insert their names in their form contracts.").
42 Joel Waldfogel, Selection of Cases for Trial, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 419, 419 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
(suggesting that "any model of the settlement decision is also at least implicitly a model
of the selection of cases for trial").
43 E.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17-20 (1984).
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assumptions, lead to predictions of extremely high (or low, depending on the
perspective) win rates.44
A second approach is to compare outcomes in arbitration to outcomes in
litigation. A business win rate of over ninety percent in arbitration does not
show that arbitration is unfair if the win rate for comparable cases in court is
similar.45 But doing a proper comparison can be difficult.46 Certainly, care
must be taken to ensure that the types of cases are reasonably comparable, as
well as to control for other differences between arbitration and litigation,
such as the greater use of summary judgment and other dispositive motions
in litigation.47
Studies of win rates in consumer arbitrations show various degrees of
consumer and business success. Two studies conducted by the AAA of its
consumer arbitration caseload in 2006 and 2007 found that consumer
plaintiffs won 48% of the awarded cases they brought. 48 The 2007 study
found that business claimants won 74% of the awarded cases they brought.49
Most of the data on outcomes in consumer arbitration have come from
studies conducted on the NAF's caseload.50 Unusual among the leading
44 Id. at 24-29; see also, e.g., Luke Froeb, The Adverse Selection of Cases for Trial,
13 INT'L REv. L. & EcON. 317 (1993); Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the
Selection ofDisputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1993).
45 See RUTLEDGE, GOOD DEAL, supra note 6, at 11 ("Studies of debt collection
actions in major cities reveal[] that the lender typically wins between 96% and 99% of
the time, right in line with the lender win-rate data cited in the Public Citizen Report.");
SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 11, at 4-5.
46 E.g., Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to
the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 735, 755-56
(2001); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-
Framing the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 843,
852-56 (2008).
47 Lewis Maltby, Employment Arbitration: Is It Really Second Class Justice?, DIsp.
RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 23, 23-24; Weidemaier, supra note 46, at 853.
48 AAA, 2007 Caseload Analysis, supra note 35, at 1; AAA, 2006 Caseload
Analysis, supra note 36, at 135.
49 AAA, 2007 Caseload Analysis, supra note 35, at 1.
50 On July 14, 2009, the Minnesota Attomey General brought suit against the NAF,
alleging fraud and deceptive practices. Compl., Minn. v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum, Inc.,
No. 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 14, 2009), available at
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/PDF/PressReleases/SignedFiledComplaintArbitrationCompan
y.pdf. NAF entered into a consent judgment on July 17, 2009, agreeing permanently to
stop administering new consumer arbitrations. Minn. v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum, Inc.,
No. 27-CV-09-18550, Consent Judgment, at 1 3, (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2009),
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arbitration providers, 51 NAF's consumer caseload consisted almost
exclusively of debt collection actions, the majority brought by a single credit
card company.52 Although there is some disagreement on how to treat cases
dismissed before an award,5 3 studies consistently showed a high win rate for
business claimants in NAF arbitrations, ranging from 67.9% to over 99%.54
By comparison, the win rate for consumer claimants before the NAF was
much higher than the win rate for consumer respondents, although again
studies disagree over the actual win rate (with reports ranging from 37.2% to
65.5%).55 Moreover, consumers brought only a handful of NAF arbitrations
each year.56
available at http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.pdf.
51 By comparison, see the AAA consumer caseload described infra Part V.A. 1; see
also W. Mark C. Weidemaier, The Arbitration Clause in Context: How Contract Terms
Do (and Do Not) Define the Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REv. 655, 674 (2007) (reporting
that 98.7% of JAMS consumer arbitrations from 2003-2006 were brought by the
consumer as claimant, as compared to 0.4% of NAF consumer arbitrations during the
same period).
52 PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION TRAP, supra note 6, at 15 ("all but 15 of the 33,948
cases are labeled 'collection' cases"); id. at 17 ("MBNA's NAF arbitration cases,
including those filed by debt buyers who purchased MBNA accounts, totaled 18,101 and
represented 53.3 percent of the NAF California cases.").
53 Compare Nielsen et al., supra note 26, at 1 (including dismissals with cases in
which consumers prevailed outright) with PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP,
supra note 6, at 10-11 (arguing that dismissals before an arbitrator is appointed "can
hardly be used as evidence of the fairness of NAF arbitration," and that dismissals after
an arbitrator is appointed might have resulted from "any number of manipulative
reasons" and should not be counted as consumer wins).
54 Fellows, supra note 25, at 32 (business claimants "prevail in 77.7% of the cases
that reach a decision"); Nielsen et al., supra note 26, at 1 (businesses prevailed in 67.9%
of NAF arbitrations either heard by an arbitrator or dismissed); PUBLIC CITIZEN,
ARBITRATION TRAP, supra note 6, at 15 (stating that in 19,294 cases in which an
arbitrator was appointed, the business won in 18,091 (or 93.8%)); Answers and
Objections of First USA Bank, N.A. to Plaintiffs Second Set of Interrogatories, Ex. 1,
Bownes v. First U.S.A. Bank, N.A., Civ. Action No. 99-2479-PR (Ala. Cir. Ct. 2000),
available at http://www.publicjustice.net/Repository/Files/McQuillanExhibit_16-19.pdf
(last visited Feb. 2, 2010) [hereinafter First USA Interrogatory Answers] (bank prevailed
in 19,618 NAF arbitrations, while credit cardholder prevailed in 87).
55 ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 27, at 9 (indicating a win rate for consumer
claimants of 54.6%); Fellows, supra note 25, at 32 (indicating a win rate for consumer
claimants of 65.5%); PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 6, at 10
(indicating a win rate for consumer claimants of 37.2%).
56 PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION TRAP, supra note 6, at 15 (reporting that 0.35% of
all NAF arbitrations involved consumer claimants).
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Monetary Recoveries. A frequent criticism of studies of win rates in
arbitration and litigation is that the usual way of measuring party wins is too
simplistic. In many studies, a claimant "win" is defined to include any case in
which the claimant was awarded some amount of money, while a respondent
''win" is defined to include only cases in which the respondent is held liable
for zero damages.57 Such an approach may understate the number of
respondent wins and overstate the number of claimant wins because a
claimant with a strong claim for a large amount is treated as "winning" even
if awarded an amount that is far less than the claim is worth.58
But it is difficult to value claims for purposes of empirical research.
Ordinarily, researchers do not have complete information about the claims,
and, even if they do, it would be extremely difficult to evaluate objectively
how much a claim is worth at the time it is brought. As a result, some studies
have used the amount sought by the claimant as a proxy for the value of the
claim, calculating the amount awarded as a percentage of the amount
claimed. 59
Even this approach, which uses the amount claimed as a proxy for the
value of the claim, is difficult to implement. First, plaintiffs in court often do
not demand a specific amount in any court filing; they may simply plead that
the minimum jurisdictional amount is satisfied. Arbitration would seem to be
less subject to this problem because arbitration fees are typically based on the
amount of compensatory damages sought.60 But even in arbitration, as
discussed below, determining a single dollar amount claimed can be
difficult. 61
Second, in both settings, merely because a party claims a particular
amount does not mean that the claim is worth that amount. Plaintiffs may
seek amounts of damages that they have only a small likelihood of
5 E.g., AAA, 2006 Caseload Analysis, supra note 36, at 135.
58 Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, supra note 6, at 557. That said, as discussed infra
text accompanying note 62, the fact that the claimant recovered a small percentage of the
amount claimed does not necessarily mean that the outcome was somehow incorrect. See
PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 6, at 12 (asserting that
definition of claimant "win" is "unreliable" when it classifies a "claimant who sought
$50,000 and received only $5" as a win for claimant). Whether that is so depends not
merely on the amount of the claim, but also on the strength of the claim.
59 E.g., Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights,
30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 29,48 (1998).
60 See infra Part III.
61 See infra Part V.A.2.
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recovering. 62 The value of such a claim can be much less than the amount
sought. Indeed, the fact that a plaintiff does not recover such an amount does
not necessarily mean the process failed; rather, it can mean that the process
worked properly.
Third, the incentives of the parties to claim damages differ depending on
whether a party is litigating or arbitrating a dispute. In court, subject to
credibility constraints, the plaintiffs incentive is to claim more, rather than
less, in damages. Court filing fees are a flat amount that does not increase
with the amount claimed.63 Meanwhile, claiming higher damages amounts
may increase the amount the plaintiff recovers. Experimental studies have
found that the amount sought by a plaintiff-even if ridiculously large--can
act as an anchor and increase the amount of damages awarded by a mock
jury. 64 By comparison, because of the way arbitration fees are structured, the
claimant in arbitration often has to pay more to claim more. 65 As a result,
amounts claimed in arbitration may be more realistic than amounts claimed
in court.66 If so, this complicates comparisons between arbitration and
litigation, because a higher percentage recovery in arbitration may be due to
more realistic amounts claimed rather than any difference in the amount
awarded. 67
A few studies have examined amounts awarded in consumer
arbitrations. 68 The CDRI found that the mean amount awarded in a sample of
California cases administered by six different providers (including the AAA)
was $33,112, while the median award was $7615.69 But data were available
62 This is the case even if the plaintiff has a meritorious claim because some
elements of the plaintiff s damages recovery may be highly uncertain.
63 Drahozal, supra note 14, at 736-37.
64 E.g., Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the
More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
519, 526-27 (1996). See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of
Private Judging, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 110-11 & n.28 (2004) (describing
studies).
65 Drahozal, supra note 64, at 129.
66 Id. In addition, parties may be subject to countervailing (or reinforcing) incentives
to the extent the success rate in arbitration varies depending on the amount sought.
6 7 See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 7 (2d ed. 2006).
68 By comparison, many more studies of employment arbitration report the amounts
of awards, including some that report the amount awarded as a percentage of the amount
claimed. See infra App. 2.
69 CALIFORNIA DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., supra note 28, at 20.
856
[Vol. 25:4 2010]
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AAA CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS
on the amount awarded in only 540 of the 2175 cases in the sample,
"limit[ing] this study's utility for the purposes of informing policy." 70
Navigant Consulting found that the arbitrator reduced the amount of the
business's claim in 16.4% of the NAF arbitrations studied, with a median
reduction of $636 and a median percentage reduction of 8.6%.71 In the
remaining 83.6% of the cases, presumably the business was awarded the full
amount claimed. According to data presented by Public Citizen, NAF
arbitrators who decided more than 100 cases in California awarded
businesses 92.4% of the total amount they sought. 72 Note that Public Citizen
apparently included amounts sought by businesses in cases in which the
consumer prevailed outright (that is, in which the business recovered
nothing) in the total amount sought. 73
Repeat-Player Effect. Unlike judges, arbitrators get paid only when
selected to arbitrate a dispute. This economic reality of arbitration has given
rise to fears of "repeat-arbitrator bias"-the view that arbitrators will decide
cases in favor of the repeat player, which is the party more likely to be in a
position to appoint the arbitrator to serve again.74 In consumer arbitration,
consumers are unlikely to be repeat players (although their attorneys may
be).7 5 Thus, the fear is that arbitrators will tend to favor businesses in the
70 Id. at 18.
71 Nielsen et al., supra note 26, at 3.
72 PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION TRAP, supra note 6, at 16 (those arbitrators
awarded businesses $185,479,341 of $200,736,495 sought).
73 Navigant used the same dataset as Public Citizen, see Nielsen et al., supra note
26, at 1, and Navigant's reported reductions otherwise would be much too small relative
to the amounts of the awards.
74 E.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer
Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REv. 1237, 1256 (2001); David S. Schwartz,
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in
an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 60-61; see also PUBLIC CITIZEN,
ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 6, at 24-26. In addition to concerns that
arbitrators might be biased in favor of repeat businesses, the same argument is directed at
arbitration providers. E.g., Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(4)
(2009) (finding that "[p]rivate arbitration companies are sometimes under great pressure
to devise systems that favor the corporate repeat players who decide whether those
companies will receive their lucrative business").
75 Budnitz, supra note 19, at 138 n.22; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in
Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What's Happening and What's
Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 949, 956 (2002). Compare Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for
Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 16 OIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 559, 566 (2001) ("[T]he real repeat players
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hopes of being selected for future cases more frequently. More broadly,
commentators have expressed concerns about what might be called "repeat-
player bias" (rather than repeat-arbitrator bias)-bias that results from
businesses structuring the dispute resolution process in their favor.76
Several factors may reduce the likelihood or consequences of repeat-
arbitrator or repeat-player bias. First, arbitration providers, as well as
individual arbitrators, may seek to maintain a reputation for fair and unbiased
decision making.77 Such reputational constraints may reduce the risk that
repeat-arbitrator or repeat-player bias will occur. Second, even if arbitrators
and arbitration providers have an incentive to make decisions that businesses
want, it is not necessarily the case that those decisions will be unfavorable to
consumers. As Gordon Tullock explains, while "a bias toward the retailer
might be the arbitrator's profit-maximizing course of action," it might not be.
Instead, "the retailer might be interested in his general reputation and want an
arbitrator who was either impartial or, for that matter, actually
procustomer."78 For example, even though the workers at return desks are
employed by the retailer to resolve disputes with customers who are seeking
to return goods for a refund, "their usual reaction is not one of making a fair
judicial decision between themselves and [the customer] but of giving [the
customer] every benefit of the doubt."79
In the consumer context, Public Citizen has argued that debt collection
arbitration before the NAF is affected by repeat-arbitrator bias. It cites both
anecdotal reports80 and evidence that the arbitrators most commonly
in arbitration are not the parties themselves but the lawyers involved.") with Lisa B.
Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 189, 198-99 (1997) (stating that "there is reason to believe that most individual
members of the plaintiffs' bar may never successfully emerge as repeat players in
employment arbitration").
76 Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory
Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 221, 231-39 (2004); Lisa B.
Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56
U. MIAMI L. REv. 873, 889-92 (2002) [hereinafter Bingham, Self-Determination].
77 Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695,
769-70; see also Weidemaier, supra note 51, at 661-62 (arguing that arbitration
providers may "confer legitimacy" by "adopt[ing] or enforc[ing] due process or 'fairness'
rules").
78 GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL: THE PURE THEORY OF LEGAL PROCEDURE
127-28 (1980).
79 Id at 128.
80 PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION TRAP, supra note 6, at 30-32; PUBLIC CITIZEN,
ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 6, at 24-25.
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appointed by the NAF are more likely to rule in favor of business claimants
than other arbitrators. 8 '
In the employment context, although several studies have identified a
repeat-player effect, they have not found evidence of repeat-player bias. For
example, employees win less often against repeat businesses-businesses
that arbitrate on a repeat basis-than against non-repeat businesses. This
repeat-player effect might be due to repeat-arbitrator or repeat-player bias,
but it might also be due to better screening of cases by repeat businesses,
who are more accustomed to dealing with disputes than non-repeat
businesses. If repeat businesses are more likely to settle weak claims than
non-repeat businesses, they will have a higher win rate in cases that go to an
award than non-repeat businesses.
For example, in a study of 270 AAA employment arbitration awards
from 1993 and 1994, Lisa Bingham found that employees won some relief in
63% of all awards in cases they brought, but won some relief in only 16% of
awards against repeat employers. 82 Similarly, employees recovered 48% of
their amount claimed against non-repeat employers, but only 11% of their
amount claimed against repeat employers. 83 Bingham's results from a
subsequent study of 203 AAA employment awards from 1993 to 1995 were
similar.84 But Bingham's evidence indicated that the repeat-player effect was
a result, not of repeat-arbitrator or repeat-player bias, but of differences in the
cases arbitrated.85 The same is true of yet another study by Bingham, this one
co-authored with Shimon Sarraf, which examined AAA employment awards
81 PUBLIC CrrIZEN, ARBITRATION TRAP, supra note 6, at 16.
82 Bingham, supra note 75, at 189-90 (defining repeat employer as one involved in
more than one case in her sample).
83 Id. at 213. For discussions of methodological issues in Bingham's studies, see
Sherwyn et al., supra note 13, at 1570.
84 Lisa B. Bingham, Unequal Bargaining Power: An Alternative Account for the
Repeat Player Effect in Employment Arbitration, IRRA 50TH ANN. PROC. 33, 38-39
(1998) [hereinafter Bingham, Unequal Bargaining Power]; Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat
Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment
Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 223, 223 (1998); see also Lisa B. Bingham,
An Overview of Employment Arbitration in the United States: Law, Public Policy and
Data, N.Z. J. INDUSTRIAL REL., June 1998, at 5, 15 (reporting an employee win rate of
25.0% in cases with a repeat arbitrator as compared to an employee win rate of 55.5% in
cases with a non-repeat arbitrator).
85 Bingham, Unequal Bargaining Power, supra note 84, at 39-40. Bingham found
that "[r]epeat player employers get to arbitration based on an implied contract stemming
from a personnel manual or employee handbook," cases in which the employee "may
have a substantively weaker legal claim." Id.
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from 1996 and 1997.86 Bingham and Sarraf found an employee win rate of
29% against repeat employers as compared to an employee win rate of 62%
against non-repeat employers. But they found no evidence this was due to
repeat-arbitrator or repeat-player bias. Rather, the repeat-player effect was
likely the result of case screening by employers with in-house dispute
resolution programs. 7 Nonetheless, Bingham's studies continue, incorrectly,
to be cited as evidence of repeat-arbitrator bias.88
Elizabeth Hill found what she described as an "appellate effect" in her
study of 200 AAA employment awards from 1999 to 2000.89 Of the 34 cases
with repeat employers in her sample, 25 (or 74%) involved employers with
an in-house dispute resolution program. The employee win rate in those
cases was substantially below the employee win rate in the other cases in the
sample, and substantially below the win rate in cases involving the other
repeat employers. 90 The differences were not statistically significant, but her
86 Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the
Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration ofStatutory Disputes Arising Out of
Employment: Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Diference, in
ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303, 320-28 (Samuel
Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004); see also Bingham, Self-Determination, supra
note 76, at 899-901.
87 Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 86, at 323 tbl.2; see Sherwyn et al., supra note 13,
at 1571 (describing Bingham & Sarraf's results and concluding that "[t]hese results
suggest that the availability of an internal review process and the employer's experience
with employment cases likely explains the repeat player effect. Bingham found no
support for arbitrator bias.").
88 David S. Udell & Rebekah Diller, Access to the Courts: An Essay for the
Georgetown University Law Center Conference on the Independence of the Courts, 95
GEO. L.J. 1127, 1152 (2007) ("[I]n many contexts, arbitrators have been shown to
develop a bias in favor of so-called repeat players.") (citing Lisa B. Bingham,
Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189,
205-10 (1997)).
89 Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment
Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 777, 807-08 (2003) [hereinafter Hill, Due Process]; Elizabeth Hill, AAA
Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP. RESOL. J., May/July 2003, at
9 [hereinafter Hill, Fair Forum].
90 Hill, Due Process, supra note 89, at 817; Hill, Fair Forum, supra note 89, at 15.
Rather than reporting an employee win rate, Hill reports an employer win-loss ratio-
dividing the number of employer wins by the number of employer losses. For repeat
employers with an in-house dispute resolution program, the employer win-loss ratio was
3.2; for repeat employers without an in-house dispute resolution program, the employer
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sample size was too small for reliable statistical testing.91 Based on her data,
Hill attributes the repeat-player effect to "the selection processes of large
employers' in-house dispute resolution programs," rather than "merely the
by-product of large employers' repeat appearances at arbitration."92 Hill
found no evidence of repeat-arbitrator bias, as there were only two cases in
her sample involving the same arbitrator and employer. 93
Most recently, Alexander Colvin examined a sample of 836 awards in
employment arbitrations administered by the AAA from January 1, 2003 to
September 30, 2006.94 Because the data were from the AAA's disclosures as
required by California law, the cases involved arbitrations "based on
employer promulgated agreements," rather than "individually negotiated
agreements." 95 Colvin found an employee win rate of 13.9% in cases against
repeat employers as compared to an employee win rate of 32.0% in cases
against non-repeat employers, a statistically significant difference. 96 The
employee win rate in cases involving a repeat employer appearing before the
same arbitrator (a "repeat employer-arbitrator pair") was 11.3% as compared
to an employee win rate of 21.2% in cases not involving a repeat employer-
arbitrator pair.97 Colvin then limited the sample to cases with repeat
win-loss ratio was 1.25. For all employers, the employer win-loss ratio was 1.3. Hill, Due
Process, supra note 89, at 817; Hill, Fair Forum, supra note 89, at 15.
91 Colvin, supra note 13, at 428-29 ("Hill did not provide any tests of the statistical
significance of the difference between the in-house program and no in-house program
groups, however a simple chi-square test on the results presented indicates that the
difference is not statistically significant."); see also Sherwyn et al., supra note 13, at 1572
("Of course, samples of thirty-four, twenty-five, and nine are too small to yield reliable
conclusions .... ).
92 Hill, Fair Forum, supra note 89, at 15; see also Hill, Due Process, supra note 89,
at 817.
93 Hill, Due Process, supra note 89, at 814-15; Hill, Fair Forum, supra note 89, at
15. Hill also argues that "the total number of arbitrators on the AAA panel in contrast to
the annual number of arbitrations shows that it is unlikely that any individual arbitrator
would have appeared with sufficient frequency to seek to reward 'repeat player'
employers," pointing out that "[t]here were 560 arbitrators on the AAA's employment
arbitration panel in 1999-2000" and "only 432 awards rendered in 1999 and 410 rendered
in 2000." Hill, Due Process, supra note 89, at 815.
94 Colvin, supra note 13, at 408; see also Alexander J.S. Colvin, Paper Presentation
at the 62nd Annual Conference of Labor, New York University, Employment and
Consumer Arbitration: What Do the Data Show? (June 5, 2009).
95 Colvin, supra note 13, at 419.
96 Id. at 430.
97 Id
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employers. In those cases, the employee win rate was 11.3% in cases with a
repeat-employer arbitrator pair and 14.7% in the rest of the cases. But the
difference was not statistically significant. 98
Overall, the empirical evidence tends to support the existence of a repeat-
player effect, but suggests that the effect may be due to case screening by
repeat businesses rather than repeat-arbitrator or repeat-player bias.
III. AAA CONSUMER ARBITRATION PROCEDURES
For consumer arbitrations administered by the AAA, the starting point
for understanding the arbitration process is the AAA's Supplementary
Procedures for Resolution of Consumer-Related Disputes."9 Under the
AAA's rules, a case is classified as a consumer case when it meets three
requirements. First, it must arise out of "an agreement between a consumer
and a business where the business has a standardized, systematic application
of arbitration clauses with customers . . . ."1oo Second, "the terms and
conditions of the purchase of standardized, consumable goods or services
[must be] non-negotiable or primarily non-negotiable in most or all of its
terms, conditions, features, or choices."10' Third, "[t]he product or service
98 Id. at 430-31.
99 American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Procedures for the Resolution
of Consumer-Related Disputes (Rules Effective Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.adr.
org/sp.asp?id=22014 [hereinafter AAA, Consumer Rules]. In July 2009, the AAA
announced that it was imposing a moratorium on its administration of most consumer
debt collection arbitrations. See American Arbitration Association, The American
Arbitration Association Calls for Reform of Debt Collection Arbitration (July 23, 2009),
available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5769. The moratorium extends to the following
cases:
[C]onsumer debt collections programs or bulk filings and individual case
filings in which the company is the filing party and the consumer has not agreed to
arbitrate at the time of the dispute and the case involves a credit card bill or, the case
involves a telecom bill or the case involves a consumer finance matter.
American Arbitration Association, Notice on Consumer Debt Collection Arbitrations,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=36427 (last visited Oct. 27, 2009). The moratorium does
not apply to individual claims brought by other creditors (such as law firms and
accounting firms) against consumers seeking to recover amounts alleged to be owed, or
to cases involving telecom bills, credit card bills, or other consumer finance matters that
the parties agree to arbitrate after a dispute has arisen.
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must be for personal or household use." 102 The AAA makes the initial
determination of whether a case is a consumer case, subject to
redetermination by the arbitrator.10 3
When a case is designated as a consumer case, the AAA's
Supplementary Procedures for Resolution of Consumer-Related Disputes
generally will apply.104 A central feature of those procedures is their
discounted fee schedule, designed to satisfy the requirement of the Consumer
Due Process Protocol that arbitration be available to consumers at a
reasonable cost.105 For consumer claims administered by the AAA, fees are
based on a three-tiered structure. For claims seeking less than $10,000, the
consumer pays up to $125.106 The full amount is applied toward the
arbitrator's fees and none to the AAA's administrative fees. For claims
seeking between $10,000 and $75,000, the consumer pays up to $375.107
Again, the AAA applies the full amount toward the arbitrator's fees and none
to its administrative fees. For claims over $75,000, the consumer pays
administrative fees based on the regular fee schedule in the AAA
Commercial Rules, and arbitrator's fees based on the arbitrator's usual rates,
with a deposit of one-half the arbitrator's fee due on filing.'08 The consumer
102 Id.; see also JAMS, The Resolution Experts, Consumer Arbitration Policy:
Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness n. 1 (effective July 15, 2009),
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-
Rules/JAMSConsumerMinStds-2009.pdf ("These standards are applicable where a
company systematically places an arbitration clause in its agreements with individual
consumers and there is minimal, if any, negotiation between the parties as to the
procedures or other terms of the arbitration clause. A consumer is defined as an
individual who seeks or acquires any goods or services primarily for personal family or
household purposes.").
103 AAA, Consumer Rules, supra note 99, R. C-l(a) ("The AAA will have the
discretion to apply or not to apply the Supplementary Procedures and the parties will be
able to bring any disputes concerning the application or non-application to the attention
of the arbitrator.").
104 Id
105 National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee, Consumer Due Process
Protocol, princ. 6 (Apr. 17, 1998), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019. For
a brief description of the fee structure governing cases brought by a single debt buyer
under a debt collection arbitration program administered by the AAA, see SEARLE CIVL
JUSTICE INST, supra note 11, at 29 app A.
106 AAA, Consumer Rules, supra note 99, R. C-8 ("Fees and Deposits to be Paid by
the Consumer").
107 Idf
108 Id If, however, the arbitration agreement provides for the consumer to pay a
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may seek a deferral or waiver of the administrative fees on a showing of
financial hardship and request an arbitrator who is willing to serve pro
bono.109
Under the AAA's rules, the business is responsible for paying all the
administrative fees and the remaining arbitrator's fees for small consumer
claims, both for claims brought by the consumer as well as claims brought by
the business. For claims of $10,000 or less, the business pays $750 in
administrative fees and an additional $200 if a hearing is held.o10 In addition,
the business is responsible for the remaining $125 in arbitrator's fees.Ill For
claims seeking between $10,000 and $75,000, the business pays $950 in
administrative fees and $300 if a hearing is held. 112 In addition, the business
is responsible for the remaining $375 in arbitrator's fees.1? For business
claims seeking over $75,000, the business pays administrative fees based on
the regular fee schedule in the AAA Commercial Rules, and arbitrator's fees
based on the arbitrator's usual rates. 114
Beyond the fee structure, a number of other features of the AAA
Consumer Rules are also worth noting. Even though the parties have agreed
to arbitrate, a party retains the right to seek relief in small claims court
lower share of the costs than otherwise would be applicable, the lower contractual
amount controls.
109 American Arbitration Association, Administrative Fee Waivers and Pro Bono
Arbitrators, www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22040 ("Pro Bono Service by Arbitrator") ("A
number of arbitrators on the AAA panel have volunteered to serve pro bono for one
hearing day on cases where an individual might otherwise be financially unable to pursue
his or her rights in the arbitral forum.").
110 AAA, Consumer Rules, supra note 99, R. C-8 ("Fees and Deposits to be Paid by
the Business: Administrative Fees"). On January 1, 2010, the AAA updated the fee
schedule for consumer arbitrations. See American Arbitration Association,
Supplementary Procedures for the Resolution of Consumer-Related Disputes (Fees
Effective Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22014. The fees
described in the text are those applicable during the time period we studied.
Ill AAA, Consumer Rules, supra note 99, R. C-8 ("Fees and Deposits to be Paid by
the Business: Arbitrator Fees").
12 Id. R. C-8 ("Fees and Deposits to be Paid by the Business: Administrative
Fees").
113 Id. R. C-8 ("Fees and Deposits to be Paid by the Business: Arbitrator Fees").
114 1d. R. C-8 ("Fees and Deposits to be Paid by the Business: Administrative
Fees"); see American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and
Mediation Procedures, COMM. ARB. R-49 & R-51 (amended and effective Sept. 1, 2007),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=36094 [hereinafter AAA, Commercial Rules].
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instead.115 In most cases, the entire proceeding is to be conducted on an
expedited basis."' 6 The AAA appoints the arbitrator from its consumer panel,
subject to the parties' right "to submit any factual objections to that
arbitrator's service."" 7 For claims seeking $10,000 or less, the default rule is
that the case will be resolved on the basis of documents only." 8 Either party
may request a telephone or in-person hearing, however.11 9 Likewise, the
arbitrator may hold a telephone or in-person hearing if he or she decides one
is necessary. For claims seeking over $10,000, the default rule is that the
arbitrator will hold either a telephone or in-person hearing unless the parties
agree otherwise. 120 The arbitrator's award "shall be in writing,"'21 and in
making the award "[t]he arbitrator may grant any remedy, relief or outcome
that the parties could have received in court."1 22
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This Part describes the research methodology of this study. It begins by
outlining the research questions of interest, and then describes the case file
sample and other data sources.
115 AAA, Consumer Rules, supra note 99, R. C-l(d); see Consumer Due Process
Protocol, supra note 105, princ. 5.
116 E.g., AAA, Consumer Rules, supra note 99, R. C-1(b) ("The Expedited
Procedures will be used unless there are three arbitrators."), C-2(b), C-4, C-6, & C-7(a);
see Consumer Due Process Protocol, supra note 105, princ. 8 ("Reasonable Time
Limits").
117 AAA, Consumer Rules, supra note 99, R. C-4; see Consumer Due Process
Protocol, supra note 105, princ. 3 ("Independent and Impartial Neutral: Independent
Administration") and princ. 4 ("Quality and Competence of Neutrals").
118 AAA, Consumer Rules, supra note 99, R. C-5.
119 Consumer Due Process Protocol, supra note 105, princ. 12 ("Arbitration
Hearings").
120 AAA, Consumer Rules, supra note 99, R. C-6.
121 Id. R. C-7(b); see Consumer Due Process Protocol, supra note 105, princ. 15
("Arbitration Awards").
122 AAA, Consumer Rules, supra note 99, R. C-7(c); see Consumer Due Process
Protocol, supra note 105, princ. 14 ("Arbitral Remedies").
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A. Research Questions: Costs, Speed, and Outcomes of AAA
Consumer Arbitrations
We examine a variety of aspects of the AAA consumer arbitration
caseload in this article. Our focus is on the AAA arbitration process itself,
rather than on comparing arbitration to litigation.
First, we describe the general characteristics of AAA consumer
arbitration cases, as reflected in the case file sample. Which cases are more
common-cases brought by consumers or cases brought by businesses? How
much do claimants seek? What types of businesses are claimants or
respondents in consumer arbitrations? To what extent are cases resolved ex
parte-that is, without one party (presumably the consumer) participating?
What proportion of arbitration cases are resolved by an award?
Second, we consider the costs of consumer arbitration, in particular the
arbitrator's fees and the AAA's administrative fees. The AAA's arbitration
rules set out the basic framework, subject to the arbitrator's power to
reallocate fees in the award. 123 To what extent do arbitrators use that power,
and how does it affect the amount of arbitrator's fees and administrative
costs that are assessed to consumers? Moreover, how does the amount of
arbitration fees compare to the amounts sought in arbitration?
Third, we look at the speed of the arbitration process-how long does it
take to resolve a case from filing to award? How does the speed of the
process compare for consumer claimants and business claimants? How does
the speed of the process compare for cases resolved on the basis of
documents as opposed to telephone and in-person hearings?
Fourth, we examine various measures of outcomes in arbitration-in
particular, consumer and business win rates, compensatory damage awards,
and compensatory damage awards as a percentage of the amount claimed.
How do consumers and businesses fare in arbitration under each of these
measures? To what extent do arbitrators also award attorneys' fees, punitive
damages, and interest to prevailing parties? Do outcomes differ in cases in
which consumers are represented by an attorney as compared to cases in
which they proceed pro se? Is there any evidence of a repeat-player effect,
with repeat businesses faring better in arbitration than non-repeat businesses?
If so, is the repeat-player effect due to bias in favor of repeat businesses or is
it due to case screening by repeat businesses?
123 See supra Part III.
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B. Data & Methodology
Our primary dataset, which we refer to as the "case file sample," consists
of 301 AAA consumer arbitration cases closed by an award between April
2007 and December 2007.124 The cases in the case file sample were drawn
from a broader AAA dataset consisting of all consumer arbitration cases
coded as closed from 2005 through 2007. We reviewed all 313 consumer
cases that were awarded from April through December 2007,125 the period
for which files were still available under AAA file retention policies.126 We
excluded the following cases from the case file sample: two cases from April
2007 for which the files had by accident been prematurely destroyed: one
case for which the case file could not be located; two cases that had been
reopened; and seven cases that were improperly labeled as awarded
consumer cases in the original AAA dataset. The case file sample consists of
the remaining 301 cases.
We then coded those cases for approximately 200 variables that describe
various aspects of the arbitration process, including: the identity and
characteristics of the parties; the identity of the parties' representatives, if
any; the AAA office and case manager that administered the case; the type of
case and amounts claimed; key dates in the arbitration process; hearing
124 In September 2007, the AAA began administering a program of debt collection
arbitrations filed by a single buyer of consumer debt. The first awards under the program
were issued in March 2008. This article does not deal with these awards because they
were issued after the time period studied. For a preliminary analysis of these cases, see
SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 11, at 13-20.
125 In addition to these 313 consumer case files, the AAA included in its broader
dataset thirty-two cases in which students challenged the cancellation of test scores.
Because those cases were different in kind from the other consumer cases in the case file
sample, in that they revolved around the cancellation of test scores and involved no claim
for damages, we excluded those cases from the case file sample.
126 Under AAA file retention policies, awarded case files are retained for fifteen
months after the date the file is closed, and all other case files (e.g., files for settled cases
and cases dismissed by the parties) are retained for six months after the date they are
closed. The AAA informs parties of these document retention policies in its
correspondence notifying them of the closing of the case file. See, e.g., Letter from
Elizabeth Cominole, Case Manager, American Arbitration Association to Richard E.
Molan & Mark T. Broth (May 20, 2008), available at http://aaup-unh.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/02/arbitration.pdf ("[I]t is the AAA's policy to retain awarded
cases for a maximum period of fifteen (15) months from the date of the transmittal letter.
Therefore, please take note that the above referenced case file will be destroyed 15
months from the date of this letter.").
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information (including the type and location of the hearing); amounts
awarded, if any; and the fees paid to the AAA and the arbitrator.
We double-checked our work using the original case files. Finally, we
corrected any inconsistencies across and within the variables. Once the data
were cleaned, we aggregated variables for multiple parties into single
claimant and respondent variables to use in the data analysis below.
The case file sample is subject to several possible selection biases. First,
the case file sample is limited to consumer arbitrations administered by the
AAA. Arbitrations arising out of clauses that specify other arbitration
providers are not included in the case file sample. To the extent providers
differ in how they administer cases, or in the types of cases or businesses
they attract, the case file sample will not be representative of all consumer
arbitrations. In particular, businesses that seek to avoid application of the
Consumer Due Process Protocol would presumably be less likely to provide
for AAA arbitration. As a result, arbitrations arising out of clauses drafted by
such businesses will be less likely to be included in the case file sample.
Second, the case file sample is limited to AAA consumer arbitrations
giving rise to an award in the last nine months of 2007. Moreover, due to
constraints on the availability of original case files and time constraints in
collecting the data,127 the time period covered by the cases is not a full
calendar year. We know of no reason why awards from the nine months
studied would differ from other periods of similar length, and no reason why
awards from 2007 would differ from awards in nearby years. One
consequence of the time period studied is that it necessarily limits the
number of cases in the case file sample.
In addition to the case file sample, when possible, we also used a larger
dataset ("AAA consumer dataset") comprising all 3220 AAA consumer cases
closed between 2005 and 2007.128 The AAA maintains this dataset in the
ordinary course of its business, collecting data for its internal purposes on
some, but not all, of the variables in which we are interested. Case managers
collect and enter the information in the AAA consumer dataset to track case
progress and to make sure the parties are charged the correct fees. Because
the AAA consumer dataset is used on an ongoing basis, the AAA updates the
127 Our ability to examine older case files was limited by the AAA's document
retention policy, described supra note 126. Our ability to examine newer case files was
limited by time and resource constraints in completing data collection for this study.
128 Before using the AAA consumer dataset in this study, we excluded the cases
identified in the file review that were not consumer arbitrations or not currently closed, as
well as the cases in which students challenged the cancellation of test scores.
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data as case information changes.129 Moreover, case managers tend to focus
on the information they need to monitor the case. As a result, data central to
the AAA's operations, such as the names of the parties, the key dates in the
case, and the total fees charged to all parties are more likely to be entered
consistently than other data on the case.
Because the AAA consumer dataset was updated by many different case
managers at different times, we expected the coding of certain variables to be
somewhat inconsistent. To determine the degree of that inconsistency, we
compared the data we collected for the 301 cases in the case file sample to
the data the AAA maintained for those same 301 cases in the AAA consumer
dataset.
Certain information was almost completely consistent between the AAA
consumer dataset and the case file sample. For example, distinguishing
between businesses and consumers is always possible, which made it
reasonably straightforward to identify the type of business involved. Further,
cases were consistently coded as either awarded or non-awarded, although it
was not possible to verify whether the non-awarded cases were properly
coded as settled or withdrawn.
Other information is less accurate, but is still reasonably reliable.
Because of the way information was entered into the AAA consumer dataset,
it was not always possible to distinguish claimants from respondents.
However, in 295 out of the 301 cases (98.0%), the claimant was the first
listed party and could be reliably identified. In 6 of 301 cases (2.0%) we
could not correctly categorize the parties as claimants or respondents by
using the order of appearance. Further, the key dates seem reasonably
accurate. The AAA did not enter the date a case was filed, instead using the
date the case was assigned in its system. We could not determine the
assignment date in our review of the files, but instead recorded the filing
dates. The differences between the filing and assignment dates averaged 5.2
days with a median of 1 day. Although we could not verify the date the AAA
administratively closed a case, we were able to determine the award dates.
For the cases in the case file sample, the award date entered by the AAA was
different from the closed date in 14 cases (4.7%). The differences for these
14 cases had a mean of 17.5 days and a median of 1 day. The differences
were likely due to minor clerical errors and the fact that, on occasion, a case
129 For example, the recorded information on the case manager responsible for the
case was changed whenever a new case manager was assigned to the case. Thus, the
name of the case manager recorded in the dataset is the name of the case manager with
responsibility for the case at the time the case was closed.
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manager recorded the date of a partial award rather than the date of the final
award.
We also find similar accuracy in the identification of claims for $75,000
or less and claims of more than $75,000. Of the 301 cases, 13 (4.3%) differed
in their categorization. Less consistent is the association of exact AAA
administrative fee amounts with each party. For the first party, the AAA
administrative fees recorded were different 33 out of 301 times (11.0%) and
for the second party they were different 40 out of 301 times (13.3%). As
mentioned above, the sums of the AAA administrative fees were consistent,
however.
Finally, the amount claimed and the amount awarded were much less
consistent than the other data we compared. 130 Specifically, the amount
sought by the first party listed in the AAA consumer dataset differed in 59
out of 301 cases (19.6%) between the AAA consumer dataset and the case
file sample. In many of these cases, it appeared that the parties or the AAA
case managers included attorneys' fees, interest, punitive damages, or other
damages together with the compensatory damages sought in a single amount
claimed. Or it is possible that the case managers entered the amount claimed
by a different party. The amount sought by the second party listed (the
majority of which were counterclaims) was entered differently in 39 out of
301 cases (13.0%). In most of the 301 cases, however, the second party did
not assert a claim. In those cases in which the second party did assert a claim,
the data were entered differently in 34 out of 48 cases (70.8%).
The inconsistencies in award amounts are similar. The amount of
compensatory damages awarded to the first party listed differed in 88 out of
the 301 cases (29.2%) between the AAA consumer dataset and the case file
sample. In many of these cases, the parties or the AAA case managers
combined the compensatory damages awarded with the amount of attorneys'
fees, interest, punitive damages, or other damages awarded. In other cases,
the case managers entered the amount awarded to a different party or did not
enter the amount awarded at all. The amounts of compensatory damages
awarded to the second party listed (the majority of which were from
counterclaims) were entered differently in 31 out of 301 cases (10.3%).
Again, however, in most of the 301 cases the second party did not assert a
claim. In those cases in which the second party did assert a claim, the data
were entered differently in 30 out of 48 cases (62.5%).
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Our access to all of the sources of data from the AAA is subject to a non-
disclosure agreement we entered into with the AAA. The non-disclosure
agreement protects the expectations of privacy of the parties to the arbitration
in their contractually specified dispute resolution process. As required by the
non-disclosure agreement, we report aggregate results about the arbitration
process; we do not include any information that might identify a particular
case or party.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: COSTS, SPEED, AND OUTCOMES OF AAA
CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS
This Part sets out our empirical findings, which are based on AAA data
from the 301 cases in the case file sample, supplemented when possible with
data from the 3220 cases in the AAA consumer dataset. Our findings address
the following: (1) general characteristics of the cases in the case file sample;
(2) the costs incurred by the parties in arbitrating their case; (3) the speed of
the arbitration process; and (4) outcomes of AAA consumer arbitrations,
including data on outcomes in cases with pro se consumer claimants and
repeat-player businesses.
A. General Case Characteristics
Because our purpose is to describe comprehensively the AAA's
consumer arbitration caseload, this section gives a general overview of case
characteristics for the 301 cases in the case file sample, supplemented when
possible with data from the AAA consumer dataset.
1. Business Claimants v. Consumer Claimants
In the substantial majority of AAA consumer arbitrations, the consumer
is the claimant.' 3 ' Of the cases in the case file sample, consumers were
claimants in 240 of 301 (or 79.7%) of the cases, while businesses were
claimants in 61 of 301 (or 20.3%) of the cases. Because we can reasonably
rely on the coding accuracy of the AAA consumer dataset for business and
consumer claimants, we used this dataset to verify the case file sample for
this variable. The results from the AAA consumer dataset are similar.
131 Thus, the AAA's consumer caseload more closely resembles the JAMS
consumer caseload than the NAF's caseload, which consists almost exclusively of
arbitrations brought by businesses against consumers to collect debts. See supra Part II.C.
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Assuming, based on our data consistency analysis,132 that the first named
party in that dataset is the claimant, consumers were claimants in 2765 of the
3220 (or 85.9%) of the cases, while businesses were claimants in 455 of 3220
(or 14.1%) of the cases. Figure 1 shows the similarity between the two data
sources.
Figure 1:
Comparison of Claimant Types












Case File Sample (301 Cases)
a Consumer Claimants
AAA Consumer Dataset (3220 Cases)
1 Business Claimants
As a general matter, the types of cases brought by businesses in the case
file sample differed from the types of cases brought by consumers. In most
cases brought by businesses, the business claimants sought payment for
goods delivered or services rendered but usually little else. In contrast, the
issues raised in cases brought by consumer claimants were more diverse,
with consumers asserting claims for non-delivery of goods or services,
claims for breach of warranty for defective goods or services, claims under
state consumer protection acts, claims under federal consumer protection
132 See supra Part IV.B.
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statutes, and the like. Because of these sorts of differences between the cases,
in the rest of our data analysis we examine cases with business claimants
separately from cases with consumer claimants.
2. Amounts Claimed
The amount sought by the claimant is an important variable for several
reasons. First, arbitration fees vary depending on the amount claimed, with
low-cost arbitration available under the AAA's consumer rules for claims
seeking $75,000 or less. Accordingly, in the rest of this analysis we examine
cases seeking $75,000 or less separately from cases seeking more than
$75,000. Second, as discussed above,133 the extent of the AAA's review of
arbitration clauses for compliance with the Due Process Protocol depends on
the amount claimed. Third, empirical studies of arbitration outcomes use the
amount claimed as a rough proxy for the value of the claim.134
But determining the amount claimed turns out to be more difficult than
sometimes assumed. 135 First, claimants sometimes combine various elements
of damages into a single claim amount, which includes not only
compensatory damages, but also interest, punitive damages, and attorneys'
fees. Because the AAA bases its fees only on the amount of compensatory
damages claimed, excluding interest, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees,
we treat those individual items of damages separately as well. In this section,
we include only amounts of compensatory damages sought as the amount
claimed. 136 Moreover, when we categorize results in this Article by the
amount claimed-usually in two categories, $75,000 or less and more than
$75,000-we likewise use the amount of compensatory damages sought in
calculating the amount claimed.
Second, although claimants must specify a claim amount in their demand
for arbitration, 137 some claimants specify the claim amount not as a single
number but as a range of numbers.138 Other claimants specify the amount
133 See supra Part III.
134 See supra Part II.C.
135 E.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 6, at 12.
136 While claimants often assert a claim for interest, punitive damages, and
attorneys' fees in their demand, rarely do they quantify those claims. For further
discussion, see infra Part V.D.2.
137 AAA, Consumer Rules, supra note 99, R. C-2(a); AAA, Commercial Rules,
supra note 114, R. R-4(a)(i).
138 We discuss here initial claims only, not counterclaims.
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claimed as an inequality, seeking less than or more than a specified amount.
For example, a demand for arbitration might claim damages of between
$10,000 and $75,000, or damages greater than $10,000. Specifying the
amount claimed as a range or inequality ordinarily does not cause problems
for the AAA in determining arbitration fees or in its enforcement of the Due
Process Protocol because the ranges or inequalities typically are tied to the
relevant threshold amounts. 139 For purposes of using claim amounts in our
empirical analysis, however, demands specifying damages as a range or an
inequality are much more problematic.
For business claimants, 1 case out of 61 (1.6% of cases) presented the
claim amount as an inequality. Consumer claimants, however, were more
likely to use inequalities or ranges in their arbitration demand. In 22 cases
out of 235140 (9.4% of cases seeking a monetary amount), consumer
claimants presented the claim amount as an inequality (16 of 22) or bounded
range (6 of 22).
We considered several options for dealing with demands specifying the
claim amount as an inequality or a range. These options included: (1)
dropping all cases specifying a claim amount as a range or inequality from
the case file sample; (2) taking the midpoint of all ranges (treating
inequalities as one end of a range bounded on the other end by the claim
threshold); or (3) using the base number of claim amounts specified as
inequalities and the midpoint for all claim amounts specified as bounded
ranges.
To enhance comparability to the AAA consumer dataset, we used the
third option.141 For claim amounts given as inequalities, we simply ignored
the inequality and used the base amount as the amount of the claim. For
example, if the claim amount was written "greater than $10,000," we used
$10,000 as the claim amount; if the claim amount was written "less than
$75,000," we used $75,000 as the claim amount. 142 For claim amounts given
as bounded ranges, we used the midpoint of the range as the claim amount.
For example, if the claim amount was written as "$10,000 to $75,000," we
139 In consumer cases, arbitration fees are a flat amount within certain ranges (less
than $10,000 and between $10,000 and $75,000), and the threshold for the AAA's
administrative review of clauses for protocol compliance is $75,000.
140 We excluded the five cases seeking non-monetary remedies from these
calculations.
141 The AAA uses the base amount of the inequality in its consumer dataset.
142 Selecting the lower end of the range in cases not specifying the claim amount
will increase the recovery rate discussed below, but the effect should be minimal due to
the small number of cases affected by this choice.
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used $42,500 as the claim amount. Because only 16 cases with consumer
claimants had claim amounts specified as inequalities and only 6 cases had
claim amounts specified as bounded ranges, the choice among the options for
measuring claim amount rarely affected the results.143
Overall, most of the cases in the case file sample involved claims for
$75,000 or less. For business claimants, 95.1% of cases (58 of 61) involved
claims for $75,000 or less. For consumer claimants, 91.5% of cases (215 of
235) involved claims for $75,000 or less, and 39.1% of cases (92 of 235)
involved claims for less than $10,000.
Because the coding of claims as greater than $75,000 and less than or
equal to $75,000 in the AAA consumer dataset is reasonably reliable, we
used that dataset to check these results from the case file sample. Again, the
findings are similar. In the AAA consumer dataset, excluding non-monetary
and unspecified claims, 94.5% of business claimants brought claims of
$75,000 or less (359 of 380 cases). By comparison, 88.5% of consumer
claimants brought claims of $75,000 or less (2190 of 2475 cases).
Consumers tend to seek larger amounts than businesses in AAA
consumer arbitrations. The average claim for business claimants in the case
file sample was $22,037 and the average claim for consumer claimants was
$46,131, a statistically significant difference. 144 There also is a statistically
significant difference in the variance of claim amounts between the two
groups.145 Figure 2, a frequency distribution with equally distributed bins,
shows that almost all business claims fall between $178 and $70,756, with a
short tail. Almost all consumer claims also fall between $178 and $70,756.
However, at least 12 cases fell outside that range, including one 'claim for
$1,200,000. Thus, consumer claims have a longer tail than business claims.
143 Option 1 resulted in higher average claim amounts than either option 2 or option
3. Further, using option 2 rather than option 3 resulted in an average difference of less
than $100 for both business and consumer claimants. The claim amount changes for 1
case with a business claimant and 16 cases with consumer claimants between options 2
and 3.
144 We used a two-group t-test for averages in claims made by business claimants
and consumer claimants excluding non-monetary claims and adjusting for unequal
variances. The t-statistic was -2.9338 (DF = 290.932 and p = 0.0036), allowing us to
reject the null hypothesis that the averages between the two groups were the same.
145 We used a two-group F-test for variances in claims made by business claimants
and consumer claimants excluding non-monetary claims. The f-statistic was 0.0504 (DF
= 60, 234 and p = 0.0000), allowing us to reject the null hypothesis that the variances
between the two groups were the same.
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Figure 2:
Frequency of Amounts Claimed by Consumer and Business Claimants
(Cases =296)
Amount Claimed ($)
(mumnts represmt the uppe HMbs of ranges)
-*-Frequency (Consumer Claimants) *6- Frequency (Business Claimants)
Because the case file sample includes only awarded cases, it is possible
that there are differences in claim amounts between awarded cases and other
types of closed cases. In order to test whether case resolution was related to
claim amounts, we added 46 business cases and 345 consumer cases to the
case file sample.146 The additional cases represent all cases with monetary
claims that were closed between April 2007 and December 2007 in the AAA
consumer dataset. Because the case file sample comprised almost all of the
awarded cases in this time period, the added cases were mostly settled,
withdrawn, or closed in some other way.
876
146 We note that the individual claim amounts coded in the AAA consumer dataset
are less reliable than the binary coding for claims of $75,000 or less and claims greater
than $75,000. See supra Part IV.B.
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For business claimants, the average claim was $22,037 for the awarded
cases in the case file sample and $18,313 for all other cases; the difference in
the means is not statistically significant. 147 Claim amounts for consumer
claimants are similar. The average claim was $46,131 for the awarded cases
in the case file sample and $66,367 for all other closed cases. Although the
other closed cases had a slightly higher average claim, the difference
between the two groups is not statistically significant.148
Counterclaims were somewhat rare in the case file sample-only 57 out
of 301 cases (18.9%) involved a counterclaim. Eleven consumer respondents
brought counterclaims: 5 sought compensatory damages of $75,000 or less, 2
sought more than $75,000, and the remaining 4 sought non-monetary relief
or the remedy sought was unspecified. Business respondents were more
likely to bring a counterclaim. The remaining 46 counterclaims were brought
by business respondents: 33 sought compensatory damages of $75,000 or
less, I sought more than $75,000, and the remaining 12 sought non-monetary
relief or the remedy sought was unspecified. Counterclaims were not
recorded consistently in the AAA consumer dataset so a comparison was not
possible.
3. Types ofBusinesses
The types of businesses involved in the cases in the case file sample
included: motor vehicle dealerships, credit card issuers, insurance companies,
home builders, finance companies, mobile home dealers, and real estate
brokers. As shown in Figure 3, the types of companies that were claimants
differed from the types of companies that were respondents. Business
claimants were mostly service providers: home builders (13 of 61, or 21.3%
of the cases), real estate brokers (12 of 61, or 19.7% of the cases), and other
service providers such as law and accounting firms (20 of 61, or 32.8% of the
cases). In contrast, the most common business respondents were motor
vehicle dealerships (66 of 240, or 27.5% of the cases) and insurance/warranty
147 The two-group t-test accounting for unequal variances resulted in t = -0.9056
(DF = 102.497 and p = 0.3673). The variances between the two groups are significantly
different however. The f-statistic was 0.4083 (DF = 45, 60 and p = 0.0021), allowing us
to reject the null hypothesis that the variances between the two groups were the same.
148 The two-group t-test accounting for unequal variances resulted in t = 1.0948 (DF
= 466.817 and p = 0.2741). The variances between the two groups are significantly
different, however, owing to several large claims in cases that were eventually settled.
The f-statistic was 7.4138 (DF = 344, 234 and p = 0.0000), allowing us to reject the null
hypothesis that the variances between the two groups were the same.
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companies (44 of 240, or 18.3% of the cases). The differing types of
businesses reflect the different nature of cases brought by business and
consumer claimants. Businesses were mostly looking to collect fees owed for
services performed while consumers were bringing claims for faulty cars and
faulty products, among others.
Figure 3:






Motor Vehicle Mobile Home Home Real Esate Other Service nsuoncel Credit Other Mobile Health Other
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Business Types
* Business Respondents A Business Claimants
The entries for business type in the AAA consumer dataset are less
reliable than for the case file sample. However, we generally found the same
business types for business claimants and respondents in both datasets.
Business claimants were mostly service providers: home builders (59 of 455,
or 13.0% of cases), real estate brokers (53 of 455, or 11.6% of cases), and
other service providers such as law and accounting firms (84 of 455, or
18.5% of cases). Common types of business respondents were motor vehicle
dealerships (451 of 2765, or 16.3% of cases) and insurance/warranty
companies (207 of 2765, or 7.5% of cases). Note that in the AAA consumer
dataset, the type of business as a percentage of the total was generally lower
than in the case file sample. This is mostly due to a higher proportion of
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cases involving credit card issuers and other creditors in the AAA consumer
dataset, most of which were closed prior to an award.
4. Ex Parte Proceedings
Of the 301 cases in the case file sample, 26 cases (8.6%) were resolved
on an ex parte basis-that is, they were resolved in the absence of one of the
parties. All 26 cases involved claims of $75,000 or less, and in all 26 cases
the absent party was the consumer. Interestingly, however, not all of the ex
parte cases involved a business claimant. Twenty-two of the ex parte cases
were brought by business claimants. The remaining four cases were brought
against businesses by consumers who then either did not appear at the
hearing or did not submit documents. Three of the four consumers originally
were represented by counsel, who filed the claim but then withdrew from
representing the consumer. Ex parte cases were not recorded in the AAA
consumer dataset, so a comparison was not possible. 149
5. Case Resolutions-Awarded Versus Non-Awarded
The case file sample is limited to awarded cases, so to examine the
frequency of other case resolutions and the relative frequency of awarded
cases we used the AAA consumer dataset. The AAA consumer dataset
consistently categorizes cases into awarded and non-awarded categories.
In cases involving business claimants, 227 (or 49.9%) were resolved by
an award and 228 (or 50.1%) were closed but non-awarded. 150 Of the 227
awarded cases, 214 had claims of $75,000 or less, 9 had claims of more than
$75,000, and 4 sought non-monetary relief or an unspecified remedy. Of the
228 non-awarded cases, 145 had claims of $75,000 or less, 12 had claims of
more than $75,000, and 71 sought non-monetary relief or an unspecified
remedy.
In cases involving consumer claimants, 887 (or 32.1%) were resolved by
an award and 1878 (or 67.9%) were otherwise closed. Of the 887 awarded
cases, 57 had claims of more than $75,000, 793 had claims of $75,000 or
149 As discussed infra Part V.D.2, the number of ex parte awards is likely related to
the win rate for business claimants.
150 The AAA database does distinguish among withdrawn, settled, and
administratively closed cases. However these distinctions are not always accurate
because the AAA relies on the parties to report a settlement or withdrawal. As such, we
distinguished only between awarded and non-awarded cases in our analysis.
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less, and 37 sought non-monetary relief or an unspecified remedy. Of the
1878 non-awarded cases, 228 had claims greater than $75,000, 1397 had
claims of $75,000 or less, and 253 sought non-monetary relief or an
unspecified remedy. Figure 4 below shows the relative differences between
case dispositions by amount claimed.
Figure 4:
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Using the key dates, which were reliably recorded in the AAA consumer
dataset, we were also able to estimate how far in the arbitration process cases
progressed before being resolved. We categorized the procedural stages
using the Assignment Date (the date the case was entered into the AAA's
system), the Arbitrator Assignment Date (the date an arbitrator was
appointed), Hearing Dates (the date or dates of any hearings, including
preliminary hearings), the Hearing Closed Date (the date the hearing, if any,
was declared closed), and the Award Date (the date of the award). Cases
were categorized by the last listed date in the database before the case was
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closed before an arbitrator was appointed; for consumer claimants, the
percentage was similar (766 out of 2765, or 27.7% of cases). But cases with
consumer claimants were much less likely than cases with business claimants
to be resolved by an award. Figure 5 shows the comparison in case
progression between consumer and business claimants.s15
Figure 5:













Assigned Arbitrator Assigned Hearings Conducted Hearings Closed
Last Procedural Stage
I Consumer Claimants
B. Cost ofAAA Consumer Arbitrations
Awarded
A Business Claimants
As described above, 152 the AAA has a tiered fee structure based on the
amount of compensatory damages claimed.153 The fees are not based on
151 We note that a small number of cases (1 .1% of cases with business claimants and
1.4% of cases with consumer claimants) have awarded dates but are categorized in the
AAA consumer dataset as settled or otherwise closed. We do not have an explanation for
this seeming discrepancy. It does not, however, materially affect our findings.
152 See supra Part III.
153 AAA, Consumer Rules, supra note 99, R. C-8.
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other amounts such as punitive damages, interest, or attorneys' fees.154 Table
1 summarizes the AAA's fees for consumer cases.
Table 1: AAA Consumer Arbitration Fees
Amount Claimed Fees Owed By Consumer Fees Owed By Business
* $750 in AAA administrative fees
<$10,000 * Half of arbitrator' fees up to $125 * $200 in Case Service Fees if a hearing is held
* Remaining arbitrator's fees (usually $125)
* $950 in AAA administrative fees
$10,000 - $75,000 * Half of arbitrator's fees up to $375 * $300 in Case Service Fees if a hearing is held
* Remaining arbitrator's fees (usually $375)
*AAA administrative fees according to the * AAA administrative fees according to the
Commercial Fee Schedule Commercial Fee Schedule
* Half of arbitrator's fees at usual rates Remaining arbitrator's fees at usual rates
This section describes the amount of arbitration fees assessed, how these
fees are allocated in AAA consumer arbitrations, and how arbitration fees
relate to the amount sought in cases in the case file sample. We have data on
arbitrator's fees and the AAA's administrative fees, but we do not have
comparable data on amounts the parties may have paid to their own
attorneys.' 55 We do not provide comparisons to the AAA consumer dataset
in this section because we were unable to break down the data in analogous
ways.
1. Fees Assessed to Consumers and Businesses
The AAA fee schedule and fee allocations by arbitrators in awards
determine the total amount of fees assessed to consumers and businesses.156
154 d.
155 Although Elizabeth Hill used awards of attorneys' fees as a proxy for attorneys'
fees paid by the parties (see Hill, Due Process, supra note 89, at 798-99) we do not
believe we have enough data to make reliable statements regarding attorneys' fees paid
by the parties in the case file sample. For further discussion of attorneys' fee awards, see
infra Part V.D.2.
156 In addition, contract provisions on occasion provide that consumers are to pay a
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In this section, we summarize the total amounts of administrative and
arbitrator's fees assessed to consumers and businesses as well as their
respective shares of those fees in the case file sample.157
In cases with business claimants, the business is assessed an average of
$958 in AAA administrative fees and $751 in arbitrator's fees, as shown in
Figure 6. In these same cases, consumers are assessed an average of $215 in
AAA administrative fees and $256 in arbitrator's fees. Thus, on average,
consumer respondents are responsible for 18.3% of total AAA administrative
fees and 25.4% of total arbitrator fees in those cases. At the tail of the
distribution, three consumer respondents were assessed AAA administrative
or arbitrator fees in excess of $1000. All three brought counterclaims of
$75,000 or more.
In cases with consumer claimants, the consumer is assessed an average
of $129 in AAA administrative fees and $247 in arbitrator fees, as shown in
Figure 6. In these same cases, businesses are assessed an average of $1161 in
AAA administrative fees and $1099 in arbitrator's fees. Thus, on average
consumer claimants are responsible for 10.0% of total AAA administrative
fees and 18.4% of total arbitrator's fees in those cases. Note that these
amounts include fees from cases with claims over $75,000, so we would
expect that, on average, consumers would pay some AAA administrative
fees. 158 At the tail of the distribution, ten consumer claimants were assessed
AAA administrative or arbitrator fees in excess of $1000. All but one
brought claims of $75,000 or more.
Overall, consumers are responsible for a larger share of AAA
administrative and arbitrator's fees when they are respondents, but never
more than approximately one-fourth of the total.
lower fee than set out in the AAA fee schedule.
157 We describe the fees as "assessed" to businesses and consumers because the
parties did not necessarily pay the fees as assessed. Further, we do not have systematic
data on the extent to which consumers received fee waivers or deferrals from the AAA,
and so we report no results on that issue.
158 See supra Part III.
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Average AAA Administrative Fees and Arbitrator's Fees Assessed by Party Type
(Cases= 301)









If we break down the fees assessed to consumers and businesses by claim
size, using the categories used by the AAA in determining fees, we find that
consumer claimants on average are assessed less than the amount specified
by the fee schedule. By comparison, consumer respondents are assessed
more on average, but this is mostly due to the fact that in a few cases the
arbitrator allocated all of the fees to the consumer respondent.159
In cases with claims of less than $10,000, consumer claimants are
assessed on average $1 in AAA administrative fees (or 0.1% of the total);160
for cases with claims between $10,000 and $75,000 they are assessed on
159 See infra Part V.B.2.
160 There is one case with a claim under $10,000 for which a consumer was assessed
AAA administrative fees, even though the AAA rules do not provide for administrative
fees to be assessed to the consumer in such a case. The fees were allocated "as incurred"
by the arbitrator after an in-person hearing, but it is not clear from the file why the
consumer was assessed these fees.
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average $15 (or 1.2% of the total);161 and for cases with claims greater than
$75,000 they are assessed on average $1448 (or 38.6% of the total).
Further, consumer claimants pay on average $95 in arbitrator's fees (or
23.4% of the total) in cases seeking less than $10,000, noticeably less than
the $125 in arbitrator's fees charged under the AAA fee schedule.162 In cases
with claims between $10,000 and $75,000, consumer claimants are assessed
on average $204 in arbitrator's fees (or 16.9% of the total), again,
substantially below the $375 charged under the AAA fee schedule.163
Finally, in cases with claims greater than $75,000, consumer claimants are
assessed on average $1256 in arbitrator's fees (or 18.8% of the total). Figure
7 summarizes these findings.
161 There are three cases with claims between $10,000 and $75,000 for which a
consumer was assessed AAA administrative fees. In all three cases, the arbitrator
allocated the AAA administrative fees equally between the parties in the award.
162 See supra Part III. This is largely due to the fact that in twenty-one cases (22.8%
of the time), the arbitrators allocated arbitrator's fees to the business respondent in the
award.
163 See supra Part III. This is largely due to the fact that in forty-seven cases (38.2%
of the time), the arbitrators allocated arbitrator's fees to the business respondent in the
award.
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Figure 7:
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Consumer respondents were generally assessed higher fees on average
than consumer claimants, as shown in Figure 8. On average, consumer
respondents were assessed $250 in AAA administrative fees and $279 in
arbitrator's fees for cases with claims less than $10,000. These average fees
are influenced by a single case in which the consumer respondent asserted a
counterclaim for over $75,000, and was assessed over $8000 in total
arbitration fees. Excluding that outlier, consumer respondents were assessed
on average $71 in AAA administrative fees and $100 in arbitrator's fees for
cases with claims of less than $10,000. For cases with claims between
$10,000 and $75,000, on average consumer respondents were assessed $65 in
AAA administrative fees and $111 in arbitrator's fees.164 Finally, for cases
886
164 In ten cases (27.8% of the time) arbitrators allocated arbitrator's fees to
consumer respondents equally, partially, or solely.
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with claims greater than $75,000, on average consumer respondents were
assessed $1767 in AAA administrative fees and $1822 in arbitrator's fees.
FigureS:
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I Arbitrator's Fees
Because we were unable to obtain data on the financial situation of
individual consumer claimants, we could not evaluate how affordable these
costs of arbitration are to consumers. Of course, all of the cases in the case
file sample are ones in which the consumer was able to bring the case; thus,
arbitration costs did not preclude the consumer from asserting his or her
claim.
2. Fee Allocations in Awards
As discussed in the previous subsection, the fees assessed to a party are
determined in part by how the arbitrator allocates fees in the award. Under
the AAA's rules, the arbitrator has the power to apportion the AAA's
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administrative fees and arbitrator's fees among the parties in the award as he
or she deems appropriate.165 Arbitrators can direct that fees be borne "as
incurred," specify that fees be shared equally by the parties, or require one
party to bear most or all of the fees. The arbitrator has discretion to allocate
administrative fees in the same or a different manner from the arbitrator's
fees.
In the majority of the 301 cases in the case file sample, the arbitrator
directed that fees be borne as incurred. For business claimants, the award
provided that AAA administrative fees be borne as incurred in 55.7% of the
cases and that arbitrator's fees be borne as incurred in 42.6% of the cases. Of
the remaining cases with business claimants, AAA administrative fees were
allocated solely to the business 36.1% of the time and solely to the consumer
respondent 8.2% of the time (five cases).166 Likewise, arbitrator's fees were
allocated solely to the business 18.0% of the time, allocated equally or
disproportionately to the business 31.2% of the time, and allocated solely to
the consumer 8.2% of the time. 167
For consumer claimants, fee allocations in awards varied depending on
the amount sought-that is, whether the case was subject to the AAA's low-
cost arbitration procedures. Specifically, AAA administrative fees were
allocated solely to consumer claimants twice; both were in cases with claims
seeking over $75,000. Arbitrators allocated AAA administrative fees equally
or partially to consumers another eight times. Otherwise, arbitrators allocated
AAA fees as incurred or solely to the business as shown in Figure 9.
165 AAA, Commercial Rules, supra note 114, R. R-43(c).
166 It is not clear why the arbitrator allocated all AAA administrative fees to the
consumer respondents in these five cases, but in two cases the consumers did bring
counterclaims.
167 The same five cases allocated both AAA administrative fees and arbitrator's fees
solely to the consumers.
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Figure 9:
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The allocation of arbitrator's fees for cases with consumer claimants was
similar to the allocation of AAA administrative fees. In the two cases in
which the arbitrator allocated AAA administrative fees to the consumer, the
arbitrator also allocated arbitrator's fees to the consumer. In twenty-two
cases the arbitrator allocated the arbitrator's fees equally or partially to the
consumer, while in another 137 cases the arbitrator ordered the arbitrator's
fees to be borne as incurred. 168 In the remaining seventy-nine cases, the
arbitrator allocated arbitrator's fees solely to the businesses. Figure 10 shows
168 Consumers must pay half of the arbitrator's fees under the AAA's low-cost
arbitration rules. See supra Part III. An award providing that arbitrator's fees be borne as
incurred has the effect of maintaining that original allocation. An award providing that











fees owed by consumer claimants, broken down by type of
Figure 10:
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3. Fees as Percent ofAmount Claimed
Finally, we calculated the total arbitration fees-AAA administrative
fees and arbitrator's fees assessed to the consumer-as a percentage of the
amount claimed. In the majority of the 235 cases in the case file sample with
consumer claimants, total arbitration fees were 1% or less of the amount
claimed, as shown in Figure 11.
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Frequency of Total Arbitration Fees as a Percent of Amount Claimed
in Cases with Consumer Claimants
(Cases =235)
II. MUM
1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0%
Total Arbitration Fees as a Percent of Amount Claimed
(amounts represent the upper limits of ranges)
The range has a long tail, due largely to a single outlier. Total arbitration
fees (i.e., both administrative and arbitrator's fees) ranged from 0.0% of the
amount claimed to 65.1% of the amount claimed. The outlier was a case in
which the amount sought was less than $200. In no other case did the total
arbitration costs exceed 25.0% of the amount claimed. The mean for the
entire case file sample of total arbitration fees as a percent of amount claimed
by consumers was 0.8%. On average, for claims of $10,000 or less, the ratio
of total fees to amount claimed for consumer claimants was 1.6%;169 for
claims between $10,000 and $75,000 the average ratio was 0.6%; and for
claims greater than $75,000 the average ratio was 1.0%.
Overall, the fees paid by consumer claimants typically constituted less
than two percent of the amount claimed.
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C. Speed ofAAA Consumer Arbitrations
Arbitration is generally considered a relatively quick form of dispute
resolution. Our results do not appear to contradict that impression, and are
consistent with prior empirical studies on the issue. 170 On average, for the
301 cases in the case file sample, the time from filing to final award was 207
days (6.9 months).' 7' The median time from filing to final award was 168
days (5.6 months), with a range of 64 to 992 days (2.1 months to 2.8 years).
Cases with business claimants were about ten days shorter on average than
cases with consumer claimants (198 days, or 6.6 months, instead of 209 days,
or 7.0 months). The median duration for cases brought by business claimants
likewise was about ten days shorter than for cases brought by consumer
claimants (160 days, or 5.3 months, instead of 169 days, or 5.6
months). However, the range was greater for cases brought by business
claimants (68 to 992 days, or 2.3 months to 2.8 years, as compared to 64 to
763 days, or 2.1 months to 2.1 years, for cases brought by consumer
claimants). The upper tails of the ranges for business and consumer claimants
were driven by a few outliers. Four cases involving consumer claimants
lasted more than a year and a half; and three cases involving business
claimants lasted more than a year and a half. Not surprisingly, cases with
higher amounts claimed tended to take longer to resolve, as shown in Figure
12.
170 See supra Part H.B.
171 We were not able to find the filing date for one of the cases so we used the
assignment date as a reasonable proxy. See Part IV.B for a discussion on the consistency
tests of the AAA dataset.
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Figure 12:








The time from filing to award changes substantially depending on the
type of hearing involved in the case. In the majority of cases in the case file
sample (187 of 301, or 62.1%), the arbitrator held either an in-person or
telephone hearing. The remaining cases were resolved on the basis of
documents only.172 Cases brought by consumer claimants whose claims were
resolved on the basis of documents only were awarded in 139 days (4.6
months) on average, or a median of 125 days (4.2 months). Cases brought by
consumer claimants and resolved by an in-person hearing were awarded in
235 days (7.8 months) on average for claims of $75,000 or less and 336 days
(11.2 months) on average for claims greater than $75,000.173 The comparable
172 In two cases, the arbitrator issued the final award pursuant to a motion for
summary disposition; we did not include those two cases in the results for cases resolved
on the basis of documents.
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median times to award were 188 days (6.3. months) for claims of $75,000 or
less and 291 days (9.7 months) for claims greater than $75,000. For
consumer claims of $75,000 or less, the difference in time from filing to
award between cases resolved by documents only and cases resolved by in-
person hearings is statistically significant. 174 Figure 13 below shows the
relative differences in average time from filing to award for consumer
claimants by claim size.
Figure 13:
Average Number of Days from Filing to Award for Consumer Claimants
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Hearing Category
M $75,000 U> $75,000
award. On average, in-person and telephone hearings lasted 1.23 days for cases with claims of
$75,000 or less, 1.91 days for cases with claims of more than $75,000, and 1 day for non-
monetary claims. Instead, presumably, the greater complexity of the cases and the difficulties of
scheduling in-person or telephone hearings account for the added time.
174 We used a two-group t-test for averages in number of days from filing to final
award for cases resolved by documents only and for cases resolved by an in-person
hearing. All cases were brought by consumer claimants seeking less than or equal to
$75,000. The t-statistic was 7.1718 (DF = 200.151 and p = 0.0000 and accounting for
unequal variances), which indicates that we may reject the null hypothesis that the
averages between the two groups were the same.
894
[Vol. 25:4 2010]
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AAA CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS
The milestone dates in the AAA consumer dataset were generally
reliable, which permits us to use that dataset as a check on our findings from
the case file sample.175 On average, the cases in the AAA dataset that were
closed by an award from 2005 through 2007 (1114 cases) took 219 days (7.3
months) from filing to award, with a median case length of 176 days (5.9
months). Individual cases ranged in length from 55 days to 1203 days (or 1.8
months to 3.3 years). Overall, the results from the AAA consumer dataset are
broadly consistent with the results from the case file sample.176
There is some potential for selection bias in both the case file sample and
the AAA consumer dataset. The case file sample is limited to cases awarded
from April 2007 through December 2007, and hence does not include cases
that were filed during that period but awarded after December 2007.
Similarly, the AAA consumer dataset does not include cases filed from 2005
through 2007 but resolved after December 2007. Thus, it is possible that, on
average, our results somewhat understate the time to award. The amount of
any understatement is not likely to change our results substantially,
however.' 77
175 For the AAA consumer dataset, we use the assignment date as a proxy for filing
date because the filing date was not captured. As discussed in Part IV.B, however,
assignment date is a reasonable proxy for filing date.
176 The AAA consumer dataset did not track consistently whether the case was
decided only by a review of documents or otherwise, so we could not use that dataset to
check the results on type of hearing from the case file sample.
177 By using cases filed or awarded in 2005 in the AAA consumer dataset as a
reasonable proxy for the mix of cases filed or awarded in other years, we can examine the
extent of any likely selection bias. Based on a review of case characteristics, we find no
reason to believe that cases filed or awarded in 2005 would be systematically shorter or
longer than cases filed or awarded in 2007. We also know of no exogenous event that
might cause a difference in the types of cases filed in either year. We relied on the AAA
consumer dataset and supplementary information from the AAA on cases still pending as
of May 16, 2008, and February 18, 2009, to construct the set of cases filed or awarded in
2005. Specifically, we looked at: (1) all cases filed in 2005 and awarded by December
2007; (2) all cases awarded in 2005; and (3) any cases filed in 2005, and listed as still
pending as of May 16, 2008 and February 18, 2009. (There might be some cases filed in
2005 but closed between January 1, 2008 and May 15, 2008, that we may not have
captured in this analysis. But the number of such cases is likely to be very small, if any
exist at all.) For the resulting 520 awarded cases, the average length of time from filing to
award was 252 days (8.4 months), and the median length of time from filing to award
was 206 days (6.9 months). Individual cases ranged in length from 65 to 1,151 days (2.2
months to 3.2 years). Additionally, according to the AAA, there were 57 cases filed in
2005 that were pending as of May 16, 2008. These same 57 cases were still pending as of
February 18, 2009. Of those cases, 53 are held in abeyance due to party agreement or
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As such, the average time from filing to award for AAA consumer
arbitration cases is approximately seven to eight-and-a-half months. By
comparison, the median time from filing to award for AAA consumer
arbitration cases is approximately five-and-a-half to seven months.
D. Outcomes ofAAA Consumer Arbitrations
In this section, we present the results of our analysis on outcomes in
AAA consumer arbitrations. First, we describe limitations of the data as to
outcomes. Second, we present general data on outcomes-win rates for
consumer claimants and business claimants; amounts of compensatory
damages, interest, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees awarded; and the
amount of compensatory damages awarded as a percentage of the amount
claimed. Third, we examine the relationship between outcome and whether
the consumer was represented by counsel. Finally, we look at what our data
suggest about the existence of a repeat-player effect and whether any such
effect results from bias in favor of repeat businesses or from case screening
by repeat businesses.
1. Limitations of the Data
We used data from the 301 cases in the case file sample to analyze
outcomes because the AAA consumer dataset does not permit reliable
tracking of party wins and award amounts. The case file sample has several
limitations. First, as discussed above, claimants-particularly consumer
claimants---do not always specify an exact amount demanded, sometimes
seeking less than or more than a particular amount or a bounded range of
amounts. 178 Our approach for dealing with this issue is described above. 179
Because only twenty-two cases with consumer claimants are affected,
alternative approaches do not drastically change the results below.
Second, claimants sometimes include interest, punitive damages,
attorneys' fees, or other damages in the amount claimed in the demand for
arbitration, instead of only including the amount of compensatory damages
court order. Should any of these cases be awarded, the time to award in the case will be
greater than 1,000 days. However, in the AAA consumer dataset, only four cases were
pending for more than 1,000 days prior to an award; thus few, if any, of these 57 cases
will likely be awarded. These cases are approximately 5% of the total cases filed in 2005.
As such, they will not likely change the average of 252 days by a substantial amount.
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sought.180 In order to mitigate this problem, when collecting the data we
segregated those other damage amounts from the amount of compensatory
damages when possible. However, there may be some claim amounts that
include interest or other damages or were amended without evidence in the
file. Unless otherwise noted, in the calculations below we report percent
recoveries using claims and awards of compensatory damages. Because
claimants often did not claim specific amounts for other kinds of damages,
calculating those percent recoveries was not possible.
Similar issues arise on the award side as well, although not as frequently.
In general, arbitrators specified in the award the types of damages being
awarded, although the award was not clear as to the breakdown of the
amount awarded in a few cases. Again, this could overstate the amount of
compensatory damages awarded.
Third, we consider any time the arbitrator found for the claimant and
awarded damages of some kind to be a win for the claimant and a loss for the
respondent, regardless of the amount awarded. We do not, however, treat the
reallocation of arbitration costs alone as making the case a win for the
claimant. We use this definition of a win for both initial claims and
counterclaims. We recognize, as discussed above, that this definition may
overstate the extent to which the claimant truly prevails on its claim.' 81 We
deal with that possibility by presenting data on the amount awarded as well
as on wn rates.
2. General Outcomes
Because of the differing nature of the respective claims,182 we present
win rates for consumer claimants and business claimants separately.183 For
cases with consumer claimants, the consumer won some relief in 53.3% (128
of 240) of the cases, as shown in Table 2. By comparison, for cases with
180 On some of the demand for arbitration forms used by the AAA, claimants can
check a box to indicate whether they are seeking recovery of attorneys' fees, punitive
damages, interest, arbitration costs, or other damages. See AAA, Form Demand for
Arbitration, http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3807 (last visited Dec. 31, 2008). Because it is
not clear that only compensatory damages be included in the line item for "Dollar amount
of claim" on the form, it is possible that some claimants included these other items of
damages in the amount claimed.
181 See supra Part I.C.
182 See supra Part V.A.1.
183 Note that we do not consider settlements in our win rates since we do not have
enough data to determine whether their inclusion would be appropriate in this context.
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business claimants, the business won some relief in 83.6% (51 of 61) of the
cases. 184 The higher win rate for business claimants may be due to the fact
that businesses tend to bring debt collection actions and other similar cases in
which the likelihood of success for the business is high.185 Although we
cannot reach any definitive conclusions about the success of consumer
claimants because we have no baseline for comparison, 186 at a minimum, we
can conclude that the consumer claimants won some relief more often than
they lost against businesses in AAA consumer arbitrations.
Table 2: Win Rates by Case Type and Party
Cases with Consuler Cases with BuSineSS
Claimants Onix Claimants Only
cDIrv C nuer Buiss Cornstner B~usiness
Wins 128 112 10 51
Total Cases 240 240 61 61
Win Rate 53.3% 46.7% 16.4% 83.6%
Consumer claimants who bring large claims tend to do better than
consumers who bring smaller claims, although the number of consumers
bringing large claims is small. As Table 3 shows, consumer claimants won
some relief in 60.0% of cases (12 of 20) seeking more than $75,000, and won
some relief in 52.1% of cases (112 of 215) seeking $75,000 or less. In both
types of cases, the consumer claimant won some relief against the business
more than half of the time.
184 If we include the fifty-seven counterclaims in the case file sample in the above
analysis, consumer claimants won some relief in 53.4% (134 of 251) of the cases and
business claimants won some relief in 80.4% (86 of 107) of the cases.
185 See RUTLEDGE, GOOD DEAL, supra note 6, at 10-11.
186 For a comparison of outcomes in debt collection arbitrations in the sample to
outcomes in debt collection cases in court, see SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note
11, at 13-17, 22-26.
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We also analyzed the amounts awarded to business and consumer
claimants. Our results are summarized in Table 4.187 The mean amount
awarded to business claimants in the case file sample was $20,648 and the
mean percent recovery was 93.0%.188 The median amount awarded to
business claimants was $11,110 and the median percent recovery was
100.0%. For consumer claimants, the mean amount awarded was $19,255
and the mean percent recovery was 52.1%, while the median amount
awarded was $5000 and the median percent recovery was 41.7%.
187 Consumer claimants prevailed in an additional nine cases, but in those cases
either the claim sought non-monetary relief or the dollar amount awarded was not
available in the case file. Accordingly, we excluded those cases from our analysis. Since
our definition of a win includes the claimant recovering any part of the claim, we did
include two cases with consumer claimants who were awarded attorneys' fees but no
compensatory damages.
188 In this section, all average percent recoveries were calculated as the average
from a distribution of each claimant's percent recovery.
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We also examined the amounts awarded to consumers based on whether
the consumer claimed more or less than $75,000, as shown in Table 5. The
mean amount awarded to consumers claiming $75,000 or less in the case file
sample was $8871 and the mean percent recovery was 51.6%. The median
amount awarded to consumers claiming $75,000 or less was $4800 and the
median percent recovery was 41.6%. For consumers claiming more than
$75,000, the mean amount awarded was $111,847 and the mean percent
recovery was 56.2%, while the median amount awarded was $78,062 and the
median percent recovery was 72.7%. Thus, prevailing consumers who
claimed amounts in excess of $75,000 tended to receive awards in excess of
$75,000. The average percent recovery between the two groups is similar,
however.
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Because we have no baseline for comparison, we cannot evaluate
whether these recoveries are favorable or unfavorable for consumers. 189 We
can say that the differing outcomes between business claimants and
consumer claimants do not necessarily show that the process is unfair to
consumers. Instead, the differing outcomes are likely due to the types of
cases brought by business claimants and consumer claimants rather than any
form of systematic bias. Business claimants usually bring claims for specific
monetary amounts representing debts for goods provided or services
rendered. Many of the cases are resolved ex parte, with the consumer failing
to appear.190 By comparison, cases with consumer claimants are much less
likely to involve liquidated amounts and more likely to be contested by
businesses.
Figure 14 further illustrates the variation in awards of compensatory
damages to business claimants and consumer claimants. In forty-one of the
fifty-one cases in which a business claimant prevailed, the business
recovered between 90.0% and 100.0% of the amount claimed. In contrast, the
distribution of outcomes for prevailing consumer claimants is bimodal. In the
119 cases in which consumer claimants received monetary awards, the
consumer recovered 20.0% or less of the amount claimed in 36 cases and
between 90.0% and 100.0% of the amount claimed in thirty-seven cases.
This bimodal distribution is consistent with studies of AAA commercial
arbitration awards1 91 and international arbitration awards.192 It also suggests
that arbitrators do not commonly make compromise awards in AAA
consumer arbitrations.19 3
189 See Part II.C.
190 Twenty-two of the sixty-one cases (36.1%) brought by business claimants were
resolved on an ex parte basis. The business won some relief in 100.0% of those twenty-
two cases, and on average recovered 94.4% of the amount claimed.
191 American Arbitration Association, Splitting the Baby: A New AAA Study (Mar. 9,
2007), available at www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32004.
192 Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not "Split the
Baby" -Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitrations, 18 J. INT'L ARB.
573, 575 (2001).
193 See Hon. Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic
Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1259, 1260-61 (2005); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in
Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 523 (1997).
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Figure 14:
Amount Awarded as a Percent of Amount Claimed by Consumer and Business Claimants
(Cases =170)
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In addition to compensatory damages, prevailing claimants also were
awarded other types of damages, including attorneys' fees, punitive damages,
and interest.
In the case file sample, consumer claimants made a claim for attorneys'
fees in sixty-five of the 128 cases (or 50.8%) in which they prevailed. In
forty-one of those sixty-five cases (or 63.1%), the arbitrator awarded
attorneys' fees to the consumer. 194 In those cases in which the award of
attorneys' fees specified a dollar amount (thirty-five cases), the average
attorneys' fee award was $14,574 and the median award was $9000. Of
194 Because claimants sometimes amended their claims without formal indication in
the AAA file, there are occasions where the claimant was awarded damages they had not
originally requested. Since we understand from the AAA that the arbitrators are not to
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course, in forty-four of the sixty-three cases (or 69.8%) in which prevailing
consumer claimants did not seek attorneys' fees, they were proceeding pro se
and did not have to pay for an attorney. 195
Of the fifty-one cases in which the business claimant prevailed, the
business made a claim for attorneys' fees in forty-one cases and was awarded
those fees in sixteen cases (or 39.0%). The mean attorneys' fee award was
$2302 and the median fee award was $1534. The data in the files were not
sufficient to determine the basis on which business claimants recovered
attorneys' fees from consumers.
Awards of punitive damages were less common. Prevailing consumer
claimants were awarded punitive damages in twelve of the forty-six (26.1%)
cases in which they were sought. The mean punitive damages award was
$39,557, while the median punitive award was $2100. The higher mean is
due to one case in which the consumer claimant received a punitive damages
award of $427,500. In contrast, prevailing business claimants almost never
sought punitive damages. Of the fifty-one cases in which business claimants
prevailed, the business sought punitive damages in three, and was awarded
punitive damages in two. The average amount of punitive damages awarded
in those two cases was $10,778.
Arbitrators also awarded interest to prevailing parties that requested it in
their claims. Prevailing consumer claimants were awarded interest in
nineteen of the thirty-six cases (52.8%) in which it was sought. Prevailing
business claimants were awarded interest in twenty-one of the twenty-seven
cases (or 77.8%) in which it was sought. Because interest is often awarded
without a specific dollar amount in the written awards, it is difficult to
determine the magnitude of the amounts awarded.
3. Pro Se Consumers
In almost half (150 of 301, or 49.8%) of the cases in the case file sample,
consumers arbitrated the case themselves-that is, without an attorney. As
Table 6 shows, consumer claimants were far more likely to be represented by
counsel than consumer respondents. This difference may be due to the
195 There are four cases in which consumer claimants proceeded pro se, yet asked
for attorneys' fees. In two of those cases, the arbitrator did not award attorneys' fees and
the claim may have been a misunderstanding on the part of the claimant in filling out the
arbitration demand form. The other two pro se consumer claimants were awarded
attorneys' fees. However, both of theses cases came to arbitration from state courts, so
the attorneys' fees claims may have resulted from fees incurred in state court or some
other involvement of an attorney in the process.
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different type of claim involved, 196 or to the fact that consumer claimants,
unlike consumer respondents, might be represented on a contingency fee
basis.
Table 6: Consumer Representation by Case Type
Cases with Cases withi
Consumer Claimants Only Business Claimants Onlv
Consumer 133 18
Represented by Attorney (55.4%) (29.5%)
Consumer 103 22
Proceeded Pro se (42.9%) (36.1%)
Consumer Did Not Appear 4 22
(Ex Parte Case) (1.7%) (36.1%)
Total Cases 240 61
* Note that one consumer respondent was represented by an attorney but eventually did not appear. This case appears
twice in the above table in the Business Claimants column -once in the first row and again in the thin row.
Accordingly, the total number of cases in which consumers proceeded pro se (150) consists of the entries in the table
above for consumers proceeding pro se and consumers who did not appear, less the one case in which a consumer
was represented by an attorney but did not appear.
As a general matter, pro se consumers have a lower win rate than
consumers represented by attorneys, both in cases in which the consumers
are claimants and in cases in which businesses are claimants. As Table 7
shows, pro se consumer claimants won some relief in 44.9% of the cases they
brought, while consumer claimants with counsel won some relief in 60.2% of
the cases they brought. By comparison, pro se consumers won in 7.0% of the
cases brought by businesses, while consumer respondents with counsel won
in 38.9% of such cases.
904
196 For a more detailed discussion of ex parte cases, see supra Part V.A.4.
[Vol. 25:4 2010]
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AAA CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS
Table 7: Consumer Win Rates by Case Type and Consumer Representation
The results are similar if we take into account the amount claimed. As
Table 8 shows, consumer claimants fare better when represented by an
attorney both for cases in which the claimant seeks $75,000 or less, and for
cases in which the claimant seeks more than $75,000, although pro se
claimants are much less common in the latter category.
















At least two explanations are possible for the higher success rate of
consumers with attorneys. 197 First, hiring an attorney may increase the
197 Prior empirical studies on employment arbitration report mixed results on the
question. Compare Colvin, supra note 13, at 433 ("[T]he employee win rate was 22.6
percent where represented by counsel and only 13.7 percent where the employee was
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consumer's likelihood of success because of the specialized advocacy skills
of an attorney. 198 Second, in deciding whether to take on a client, attorneys
accept only cases that are more likely to prevail, screening out less
meritorious cases. From our data, we are unable to distinguish between these
two explanations.
In addition to a higher win rate, consumer claimants who are represented
by attorneys also tend to receive higher damages awards. As shown in Table
9,199 consumer claimants with attorneys received an average award of
$27,233 and a median award of $6702, while pro se claimants received an
average award of $5656 and a median award of $3029. 200
Similar explanations are possible here as with win rates-either attorneys
are able to obtain higher recoveries for their clients, or attorneys screen cases
for those with higher potential recoveries. Our data again are unable to
distinguish definitively between these two explanations, although they are
suggestive. All consumer claimants who filed claims and were represented
by attorneys sought an average of $57,529 in compensatory damages, while
pro se claimants sought an average of $31,774, a difference that is
statistically significant, albeit at the 10% level.201 Likewise, median claim
amounts are higher for consumer claimants with attorneys ($32,000 versus
$8576 for pro se claimants). While higher claim amounts may in part reflect
value added by attorneys, it seems likely that a substantial part of the
difference reflects the underlying value of the claim. As such, the data at
self-represented, a statistically significant difference . . . .") with Hill, Fair Forum, supra
note 89, at 15 ("The win-loss ratio for both lower-income employees with representation
and those who proceeded pro se was .50."); Hill, Due Process, supra note 89, at 819
(reporting similar results).
198 Because of the less formal nature of arbitration, this explanation seems
somewhat weaker than it would as applied to a case in court, although clearly at least
some of an attorney's skills are transferable from court to arbitration.
199 The outcomes results are only for those cases with known amounts of
compensatory damages claimed and awarded.
200 We used a two-group t-test for averages in compensatory damages awards to pro
se consumer claimants and consumer claimants with counsel, excluding non-monetary
claims and awards and accounting for unequal variances. The t-statistic was 2.9591 (DF
= 78.6227 and p = 0.0041), which indicates that we may reject the null hypothesis that
the averages between the two groups were the same.
201 We used a two-group t-test for averages in claims made by represented and pro
se consumer claimants, excluding non-monetary claims and accounting for equal
variances. The t-statistic was 1.7093 (DF = 233 and p = 0.0887), which indicates that we
failed to reject the null hypothesis that the averages between the two groups were the
same at higher than the 10% level.
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least suggest that consumer claimants are more likely to be represented by
counsel in cases with higher stakes.202
Table 9: Compensatory Damages Recovered by Consumer Claimants by Consumer Representation
Preouiling Consumer ('13aimal Preailing Pro se
\warded Claimed Armt. Cklim d) klarde-d ( lainwd \mi1.laimeid)
Maximum $419259 $500,000 100.0% $44,472 $99,898 100.0%
Minimum $0 $2,770 0.0% $0 $178 0.0%
Average $27233 $57,659 449% $5,656 $12,483 643%
Median $6,702 $33,905 313% $3,029 $7,342 72.8%
Std. Dev. $62,171 $78,760 38.4% $8,472 $18,650 37.0%
Cases 75 75 75 44 44 44
Two additional results are worth noting. First, pro se consumer claimants
recovered a higher percentage of the amount claimed than consumers who
were represented by attorneys. Prevailing pro se consumer claimants
averaged a 64.3% recovery of the amount claimed, while prevailing
consumer claimants with attorneys averaged a 44.9% recovery of the amount
claimed. We have no clear explanation for this finding.203
Second, consistent with findings reported in the previous section,204 of
the eighty cases in which prevailing consumer claimants were represented by
attorneys, the claimant was awarded attorneys' fees in thirty-nine of the
sixty-one cases in which they were sought (a success rate of 63.9%). The
frequency with which attorneys' fees are awarded in arbitration provides at
least some incentive for attorneys to agree to represent consumers in
arbitration.
202 Attorneys will be more likely to accept cases with higher stakes, while cases
with lower stakes may encourage consumers to minimize their costs and forego legal
representation.
203 One possibility is that attorneys are more aggressive in formulating damages
claims than pro se claimants. A second possibility is that attorneys are less precise in their
demands, specifying ranges rather than precise amounts of damages.
204 See supra Part V.D.2.
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4. Repeat-Player Effect
As discussed above, previous research on employment arbitration has
found a "repeat-player effect," in which businesses that arbitrate on a regular
basis tend to have a higher win rate than businesses that arbitrate less
often.205 Several possible explanations for the repeat-player effect have been
offered. The first is that the repeat-player effect is due to bias on the part of
arbitrators and arbitration service providers, seeking to curry favor with
businesses that are more likely to provide future business. The second is that
businesses are able to structure the arbitration process in a favorable manner
through their control of dispute system design. The third is that the repeat-
player effect is due to case selection by repeat businesses, who are more
sophisticated in their case screening than non-repeat businesses. We first
look at whether there is a repeat-player effect in the AAA's consumer cases.
Finding some evidence of such an effect, we then test for whether the effect
is likely due to bias (of arbitrators or otherwise) or case selection.
To test for the presence of a repeat-player effect, we used two different
definitions of repeat business. First, we defined a business to be a repeat
business when it appeared more than once in the AAA consumer dataset. 206
We refer to a business that meets this definition of a repeat business as a
"repeat(l) business." Second, we used information from the AAA business
list (which it maintains to help in administering the Consumer Due Process
Protocol 207) to identify a category of repeat businesses. On the AAA business
list, the AAA identifies a sub-category of "acceptable businesses"
(businesses for which it will administer consumer arbitrations). The
businesses in this sub-category are typically large entities for which there had
been some prior confusion over the appropriate contact person when a
consumer brought a claim against the business. For those businesses, the
AAA business list typically identifies an appropriate contact person to
receive the demand for arbitration. The fact that those businesses have had
additional dealings with the AAA in administering their consumer
arbitrations may make it appropriate to treat them as repeat businesses. We
205 See supra Part II.C.
206 This definition is similar to that used in other studies in that it focuses on the
number of times the business appears in cases in the case file sample. E.g., Colvin, supra
note 13, at 430; Hill, Fair Forum, supra note 89, at 15. It differs from other studies in
that we are able to use a broader sample of cases in determining the number of times the
business appears.
2 0 7 See CONSUMER ARBITRATION TASK FORCE, SEARLE CIVIL JUST. INST.,
CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 42 (2009).
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refer to businesses that meet this definition of repeat business as "repeat(2)
businesses."
Using the first definition of repeat business (businesses who appear more
than once in the AAA consumer dataset), we do not find statistically
significant evidence of a repeat-player effect in the cases in the case file
sample. As shown in Table 10, consumer claimants won some relief in
51.8% of cases against repeat(l) businesses and 55.3% of cases against non-
repeat businesses, a difference that is not statistically significant. 208 In cases
in which the business is the claimant, consumers won some relief in 13.3% of
cases against repeat(l) businesses and 25.0% of cases against non-repeat
businesses. But in this latter case the sample size is too small to reliably test
for a statistically significant difference. Again, using this definition of repeat
business we do not find a statistically significant repeat-player effect.
Moreover, consumer claimants still recover some amount against both
repeat(1) and non-repeat businesses over half the time in the case file sample.
Table 10: Consumer Win Rates by Case Type and Presence of a Repeat(1) Business
Cases with Cases with
Consumer Clamants Only Business Claimants Only
Business Type All Repeat(1) All Repeat(l)
Repeat Repeat
Consumer Wins 128 71 57 10 6 4
Total Cases 240 137 103 61 45 16
Consumer Win Rate 533% 51.8% 553% 164% 133% 25.0%
The results are similar when we categorize consumer claimants by
amount claimed. The difference in Table 11 is that consumers tend to do
better against repeat(1) businesses when claiming more than $75,000,
although, again, the sample size is too small for reliable statistical analysis.
909
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to allow us to reject the null hypothesis that consumer wins are not associated with
whether the respondent is a repeat(1) business.
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Table 11: Consumer Claimant Win Rates by Amount Claimed and Presence of a Repeat(1) Business
Consumer Amount Claimed Consumer Amount Claimed
:$75000 >$75000
Business Type Repeat(1) NonrRepeat Repeat() Non-Repeat
Consumer Wins 60 52 7 5
Total Cases 121 94 11 9
Consumer Win Rate 49.6% 553% 63.6% 55.6%
As shown in Table 12, consumers who prevail against a repeat(1)
business are awarded a higher percentage of the mean (and median) amount
of compensatory damages claimed than consumers who prevail against non-
repeat businesses. Prevailing consumer claimants are awarded on average
60.9% of compensatory damages claimed against repeat(l) businesses (and
75.6% of compensatory damages claimed at the median) and on average
41.4% of the amount claimed against non-repeat businesses (and 31.4% of
the amount claimed at the median), a statistically significant difference. 209
Although we have no clear explanation for these results, at a minimum, they
seem inconsistent with the existence of a repeat-player effect.210
209 We used a two-group t-test for averages in percent recoveries between consumer
claimants arbitrating against repeat(1) businesses and non-repeat businesses, excluding
non-monetary claims and awards and accounting for equal variances. The t-statistic was -
2.7983 (DF = 117 and p = 0.0060), which indicates that we may reject the null hypothesis
that the averages between the two groups were the same.
210 Some other studies include zero dollar awards (i.e., claimant losses) in
calculations of the percentage recovery, which makes comparisons to those studies
difficult. See Colvin, supra note 13, at 429-31. We exclude zero dollar awards from
Table 12 so that we can examine percentage recovery separately from win rate; including
zero dollars awards would conflate the two measures.
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Table 12: Compensatory Damages Recovered by Consumer Claimants by Presence of a Repeat(1) Business
Prevailing Consumer Claimants Prevailing Consumer Claimants
Repeat(1) Business Present Non-Repeat Business Present
Compensatory Compensatory % Recovery Compensatory Compensatory % Recovery
Damages Damages (Amt.Awarded/ Damages Damages (Amn.Awarded!
Awarded Claimed Am.Claimed Awarded Claimed Ant.Clalmed)
Maximum $250,000 $300,000 100.0% $419259 $500,000 100.0%
Minimum $1 $178 0.0% $0 $538 0.0%
Average $20,084 $39,467 609% $18256 $42,746 41A%
Median $6,000 $12,000 75.6% $4,475 $22,742 31A%
Std. Dev. $43,407 $59386 39A% $58,494 $75,805 35.8%
Cases 65 65 65 54 54 54
Using the second definition of repeat business (based on a sub-category
of businesses on the AAA business list), we find a greater repeat-player
effect, at least as to win rates, albeit one that is weakly statistically
significant. As Table 13 shows, consumer claimants won some relief in
43.4% of cases against repeat(2) businesses and 56.1% of cases against non-
repeat businesses, a difference that is statistically significant at the 10%
level.211 In cases in which the business is the claimant, consumers won in
none of the cases against repeat(2) businesses and 16.4% of cases against
non-repeat businesses. But in this latter case the sample size is too small for
reliable tests of statistical differences.
Table 13: Consumer Win Rates by Case Type and Presence of a Repeat(2) Business
Cases with Cases with
Consumer Claimants Only Business Claimants Only
Non- Non-Business Type All Repeat(Z) Non- All Repeat (2Repeat Repeat
Consumer Wins 128 23 105 10 0 10
Total Cases 240 53 187 61 7 54
Consumer Win Rate 53.3% 434% 56.1% 164% 0.0% 18.5%
211 The Pearson's Chi-squared statistic is 2.6987 (DF = I and p = 0.100), which fails
beyond the 10% level to allow us to reject the null hypothesis that consumer wins are not
associated with whether the respondent is a repeat(2) business.
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The results are similar when we categorize consumer claimants by the
amount claimed, as Table 14 indicates. The win rate for consumer claimants
seeking $75,000 or less is 39.1% against repeat(2) businesses and 55.6%
against non-repeat businesses, a statistically significant difference at the 5%
level.212 By comparison, consumers seeking more than $75,000 won some
relief more often against repeat(2) businesses than against non-repeat
businesses, but the number of such cases is too small to reliably test the
results statistically.
Table 14: Consumer Claimant Win Rates by Amount Claimed and Presence of a Repeat(2) Business
Consumer Amount Claimed Consumer Amount Claimed
<s$75,000 >$75,000
Business Type Repeat(2) Non-Repeat Repeat(2) Non-Repeat
Consumer Wins 18 94 4 8
Total Cases 46 169 5 15
Consumer Win Rate 39.1% 55.6% 80.0% 53.3%
Again, as Table 15 shows, if consumer claimants do prevail on their
claim, they are awarded on average an almost identical percent of the amount
claimed against repeat(2) businesses (52.4%) as against non-repeat
businesses (52.0%).213 The results are reversed for the median, with
prevailing consumer claimants being awarded at the median a lower
percentage of the amount claimed against repeat(2) businesses (39.5%) than
against non-repeat businesses (41.7%).
212 The Pearson's Chi-squared statistic is 3.9402 (DF = 1 and p = 0.0470), which
fails beyond the 5% level to allow us to reject the null hypothesis that consumer wins for
cases with claims of less than $75,000 are not associated with whether the respondent is a
repeat(2) business.
213 We used a two-group t-test for averages in percent recoveries between consumer
claimants arbitrating against repeat(2) businesses and non-repeat businesses, excluding
non-monetary claims and awards and accounting for equal variances. The t-statistic was -
0.0485 (DF = 117 and p = 0.9614), which indicates that we failed to reject the null
hypothesis that the averages between the two groups were the same.
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Table 15: Compensatory Damages Recovered by Consumer Claimants by Presence of a Repeat(2) Business
Prevailing Consumer Claimants Prevailing ConsumerClaimants
Repeat(2) Business Present Non-Repeat Business Present
Compensatory Compensatory % Recovery Compensatory Compensatory % Recovery
Damages Damages (Amo Awarded) Damages Damages (Amt. Awarded
Awarded Claimed Ams.Claimed) Awarded Claimed AmtClaimed)
Maximum $250,000 $250,000 1000% $419259 $500,000 100.0%
Minimum $15 $178 03% $0 $192 0.0%
Average $26,693 $46,803 52A% $17,568 $39,629 52.0%
Median $4,00 $23313 395% $5,000 $15,893 41.7%
Std. Dev. $56,37 $62,58 40.1% $49309 $68,193 388%
Cases 22 22 22 97 97 97
Overall, then, we find some evidence of a repeat-player effect when
using our second definition of repeat business, and even then only as to win
rates and not as to percentage recoveries. But as discussed above,214 the
existence of a repeat-player effect does not necessarily show arbitrator (or
other) bias in favor of repeat businesses. Instead, a repeat-player effect also
may result from case selection by repeat businesses, who settle meritorious
claims and arbitrate only weaker claims, while non-repeat businesses are
more likely to arbitrate all claims, even meritorious ones.
Our evidence tends not to support the hypothesis that arbitrator (or other)
bias is the likely explanation for any repeat-player effect in the case file
sample. First, cases with repeat player combinations of any kind make up a
small portion of the case file sample. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
we find evidence that case screening by businesses may explain any repeat-
player effect in the case file sample. Specifically, we find that repeat
businesses are more likely to settle or otherwise close cases before an award
than non-repeat businesses.
First, a small percentage of cases in the case file sample involved any
combination of repeat players, such as repeat pairs of arbitrators and
businesses, arbitrators and attorneys for businesses, arbitrators and
consumers, arbitrators and attorneys for consumers, as well as businesses and
consumers. In the case file sample, 35 of 301 cases (11.6%) involved repeat
214 See supra Part II.C.
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pairs of any kind (see Table 16).215 Of those thirty-five cases, seven involved
business claimants and twenty-eight involved consumer claimants.
Table 16: Cases with Repeat Combinations
Combination Type Number of Cases
Arbitrator and Business 27
Arbitrator and Business Attorney 29
Arbitrator and Consumer 2
Arbitrator and Consumer Attorney 11
Business and Consumer 4
In all of the cases with repeat combinations that were brought by
business claimants, the business won some relief (7 of 7, or 100.0%), which
may be due to the types of cases involved. However, in two of those cases
the consumers asserted counterclaims and won some relief on those
counterclaims both times.
In the twenty-eight cases with consumer claimants, consumers won some
relief in twelve (or 42.9% of the cases), a slightly lower win rate than for the
entire case file sample. 216 This lower win rate might be due to the fact that
the majority of the consumers in the cases with repeat combinations were
proceeding pro se (16 out of 28 cases, or 57.1%), a higher rate than for the
entire case file sample. 217 Because pro se consumers tend to have a lower
win rate than consumers with attorneys,218 it may be the lack of legal
215 Multiple repeat pairs were present in many of the cases. Hence, the numbers in
Table 16 add to significantly more than the total thirty-five cases with repeat pairs.
216 Thirteen of the twenty-eight cases involved the same business respondent;
consumers won some relief in roughly half of those cases (6 of 13, or 46.2%). Due to the
small number of cases, we cannot reliably test this difference statistically.
217 Due to the small number of cases, we cannot reliably test this difference
statistically.
218 See supra Part V.D.3.
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representation rather than the presence of a repeat pair that explains the lower
win rate in these cases. 219
Second, if the repeat-player effect were due to case screening rather than
arbitrator bias, one might expect that repeat businesses would be more likely
to settle or otherwise resolve cases before an award than non-repeat
businesses. To test for this possibility, we used the AAA consumer dataset,
limited to the same period (April-December 2007) as the case file sample.
Table 17 summarizes case dispositions (either as awarded or non-awarded)
for cases in which consumer claimants brought claims against repeat(2)
businesses. 220 Of consumer claims against repeat(2) businesses, 71.1% (133
of 187) were resolved prior to an award, while 54.6% (226 of 414) of
consumer claims against non-repeat businesses were resolved prior to an
award, a statistically significant difference. 221 Thus, consistent with the
hypothesis that the repeat-player effect is due to case screening, we find that
repeat businesses are more likely to resolve cases prior to an award.
Table 17: Disposition of Cases by Consumer Claimants
Against Repeat(2) and Non-Repeat Businesses





Total Cases 187 414
219 The presence of a repeat business-arbitrator pair cannot explain the consumer's
pro se status because the arbitrator would not be appointed until after the consumer filed
the claim.
220 We used the second definition of repeat business because only for repeat
businesses so defined did we find any evidence of a repeat-player effect.
221 The Pearson's Chi-squared statistic is 14.6401 (DF = 1 and p = 0.000), which
allows us to reject the null hypothesis that whether a case is awarded is not associated
with whether the respondent is a repeat (2) business.
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In short, while we find some indication of a repeat-player effect, the
evidence seems to suggest that the repeat-player effect is more likely due to
case screening by repeat businesses than arbitrator (or other) bias.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our central empirical findings are as follows:
* Consumer claimants brought the substantial majority (approximately
86.0%) of cases in the AAA consumer dataset from 2005 through
2007. Of the cases brought by consumer claimants, 32.1% were
resolved by an award, while in cases brought by business claimants,
49.9% were resolved by an award. The remaining cases typically
were either settled or dismissed voluntarily by the parties.
* Overall, in the case file sample of consumer cases awarded from
April 2007 through December 2007, consumer claimants were
assessed an average of $129 in AAA administrative fees and $247 in
arbitrator's fees. Consumer claimants seeking less than $10,000 were
assessed an average of $1 in AAA administrative fees and $95 in
arbitrator's fees, while consumer claimants seeking between $10,000
and $75,000 were assessed an average of $15 in AAA administrative
fees and $204 in arbitrator's fees. Consumer claimants seeking more
than $75,000 were assessed an average of $1448 in administrative
fees and $1256 in arbitrator's fees. For cases subject to the AAA's
low-cost consumer arbitration rules (i.e., with a claim amount of
$75,000 or less), consumers almost never paid more than the amount
specified in the rules and often paid less - as a result of the arbitrator
reallocating some portion of the consumer's share of costs to the
business in the award.
* The average time from filing to final award for the AAA consumer
arbitration cases in the case file sample was 207 days (6.9 months),
subject to some possible degree of case selection bias. Cases with
business claimants were resolved in 198 days (6.6 months) on
average; cases with consumer claimants were resolved in 209 days
(7.0 months) on average.
* Of the cases in the case file sample, consumer claimants won some
relief in 53.3% of the cases (128 of 240) they brought. On average,
successful consumer claimants were awarded $19,255 in
compensatory damages and recovered 52.1% of the amount they
sought; the median amount awarded was $5000 and the median
percent recovery was 41.7%. Business claimants won some relief in
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83.6% of the cases (51 of 61) they brought. On average, successful
business claimants were awarded $20,648 and recovered 93.0% of
the amount they sought; the median amount awarded was $11,110
and the median percent recovery was 100.0%. We cannot evaluate
whether these recoveries are favorable or unfavorable for consumers.
* Consumer claimants sought to recover attorneys' fees in sixty-five of
the 128 cases in which they were awarded damages. In forty-one of
those sixty-five cases (or 63.1%), the arbitrator awarded attorneys'
fees to the consumer. In those cases in which the award of attorneys'
fees specified a dollar amount (35 cases), the average attorneys' fee
award was $14,574 and the median award was $9000.
* Under the usual definition of a repeat business, we find no
statistically significant repeat-player effect: consumer claimants won
some relief in 51.8% of cases against repeat businesses so defined
and 55.3% of cases against non-repeat businesses, a difference that is
not statistically significant. Under an alternative definition of a
repeat business, based on the AAA's categorization of businesses in
enforcing compliance with the Consumer Due Process Protocol, we
find some evidence of a repeat-player effect as to win rate (claimants
won some relief in 43.4% of cases against repeat businesses and
56.1% of cases against non-repeat businesses, a difference that is
weakly statistically significant) but not as to the percentage of claim
amount recovered by consumer claimants (claimants actually were
awarded a higher percentage of the amount claimed against repeat
businesses than against non-repeat businesses). But the evidence
suggests that any repeat-player effect is not due to arbitrator (or
other) bias in favor of repeat businesses. Instead, it appears to result
from case screening by repeat businesses, with those businesses
resolving consumer claims prior to an award at a much higher rate
than non-repeat businesses.
An important implication of these findings is that not all consumer
arbitrations are alike. In the case file sample of AAA consumer arbitrations,
for example, the types of claims brought by consumer claimants differed
from the types of claims brought by business claimants. Arbitration clauses
in some types of contracts commonly included class arbitration waivers,
while arbitration clauses in other types of contracts did not. Likewise, not all
arbitration providers are alike. Some administer claims that are
predominantly brought by businesses, while others have a higher proportion
of claims brought by consumers. Policymakers should not assume that
empirical findings for one type of consumer arbitration necessarily will be
917
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the same for other types. Nor should policymakers assume that empirical
findings for arbitrations administered by one arbitration provider necessarily
will be the same for arbitrations administered by other providers. Of course,
the same holds true for the empirical findings in this article-that they do not
necessarily hold for other types of arbitration or for other arbitration
providers. These variations suggest the need for a nuanced approach to
public policy concerning arbitration.
Despite the insights that empirical research can provide, it nonetheless
has important limitations. First, our results are limited to AAA consumer
arbitrations. Our data do not address arbitrations administered by other
arbitration providers. Second, one must have a baseline for comparison to
evaluate the cost, speed, and outcomes of consumer arbitrations; data on
arbitration proceedings alone are not enough. Accordingly, this article's
findings are only a beginning. While they provide a look into consumer
arbitrations administered by the AAA, further work remains to be done.
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APPENDIX 1.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION
This appendix lists the empirical studies of consumer arbitration
discussed in the body of this Article. For each study, it describes the sample
and summarizes the central findings of the study. It also briefly describes any
criticisms of the study.
A. AAA Consumer Arbitration
1. AM. ARB. ASS'N, ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION'S CONSUMER ARBITRATION CASELOAD: BASED ON
CONSUMER CASES AWARDED BETWEEN JANUARY AND AUGUST 2007,
available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=5027.
Sample: 310 AAA cases resulting in an award from January 2007
through August 2007.222
Findings: 41% of the cases were decided on the basis of documents only,
while 59% were resolved after a telephone or in-person hearing. Cases on
average took about four months to resolve on the basis of documents and
about six months to resolve on the basis of an in-person hearing. Consumer
claimants won 48% of awarded cases they brought; business claimants won
74% of awarded cases they brought. 223
Criticisms: Public Citizen criticized the AAA's analysis on several
grounds. First, it found the win rate calculated by the AAA to be "unreliable
because any arbitrator award was counted as a win, regardless of its relation
to the amount sought. This means, for example, that AAA would deem
victorious a claimant who sought $50,000 and received only $5."224 Second,
Public Citizen faulted the AAA because Public Citizen was unable to
duplicate the AAA's findings from the AAA's public disclosures. 225 Third,
Public Citizen pointed out that business claimants had a higher win rate than
consumer claimants.226
222 AAA, 2007 Caseload Analysis, supra note 35.
223 Id.
224 PUBLIC CfiZEN, ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 6, at 12.
225 Id. ("[W]e could discern the victorious party only in approximately 7 percent of
the cases. AAA left the 'prevailing party' field-a required disclosure-blank in more
than 90 percent of the cases it has reported.").
226 Id
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2. Statement of the American Arbitration Association, Annex D, in The
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the
Constitution Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
135 (2007)
Sample: 987 cases brought by consumer claimants before the AAA that
were resolved in 2006.227
Findings: The AAA reported that 42% of the cases were resolved by an
award, while 58% were resolved prior to an award. The consumer was
awarded some monetary relief in 48% of the cases resolved by an award.
Cases awarded on the basis of documents (34% of all awarded cases) took on
average 3.8 months to resolve; cases awarded following an in-person hearing
(66% of all awarded cases) took on average 7.4 months.228
3. ERNST & YOUNG, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF CONSUMER LENDING CASES 16, App. A (2004), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/
2005ErnstAndYoung.pdf.
Sample: As part of its study of NAF arbitrations described below, 229
Ernst & Young examined forty-four AAA consumer cases classified as
involving "banking" disputes. The cases were among those included on the
AAA web site as part of its required disclosures under California law.230
Findings: Ernst & Young reported that: (1) the average amount claimed
was $81,371; (2) the average fee paid (in the 31 cases for which such
information was available) was $1935; (3) 50% of the cases settled, 11%
were withdrawn by the claimant, and in the remaining 39% the arbitrator
issued a decision; and (4) no information was provided for the amount
awarded and rarely was the prevailing party identified.231
B. Other Consumer Arbitration
1. Memorandum from Jeff Nielsen et al. re: National Arbitration Forum:
California Consumer Arbitration Data 3 (July 18, 2003), available at
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/get-ilr doc.php?docld=1212.
227 AAA, 2006 Caseload Analysis, supra note 36, at 135.
228 Id.
229 See infra text accompanying notes 251-59.
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Sample: Same as in Public Citizen, The Arbitration Trap (see study no.
2, below).232
Findings: Of the 33,948 total NAF arbitrations, 26,665 were either heard
by an arbitrator or dismissed (the excluded cases were settlements). Navigant
concluded that "[o]f these 26,665 arbitrations, consumer parties were
reported to have prevailed outright or had the case against them dismissed in
8558 cases (32.1%). Claims against consumers were reduced by NAF in an
additional 4376 cases (16.4%)."233 According to Navigant, "the median
reduction was $636 and the median percentage reduction was 8.6%."234 Of
the 33,935 cases in which an arbitration fee was paid, the consumer paid no
fee in 33,689 cases (99.3%). In the remaining 246 cases, the median fee paid
by the consumer was $75.235
Criticisms: Public Citizen criticized the Navigant report on several
grounds. First, the vast majority (8534 of 8558, or 99.6%) of the cases that
Navigant treated as cases in which the consumer prevailed were dismissals,
rather than awards. And of the dismissals, almost all (7783, or 91.2%)
occurred before an arbitrator was appointed. According to Public Citizen:
"These cases can hardly be used as evidence of the fairness of NAF
arbitration. They scarcely involved arbitration at all."236 Second, the 700
dismissals after appointment of an arbitrator, according to Public Citizen,
might have occurred "for any number of manipulative reasons," such that "it
is possible that the consumers who 'won' the cases . .. lost the very same
cases later."237
2. JOHN O'DONNELL, ET AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP:
How CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 1 (Sept. 2007),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf.
Sample: Relying on the National Arbitration Forum's California
disclosures (which it reformatted into an Excel spreadsheet 238), Public
232 Nielsen et al., supra note 26, at 1; see infra text accompanying notes 238-45.
233 Nielsen et al., supra note 26, at 1.
234 Id. at 3.
235 Id.
236 PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 6, at 10.
237 Id. at 11.
238 See Public Citizen, NAF California Data Jan. 2003 to Mar. 2007, available at
http://www.citizen.org/congress/civjus/arbitration/NAFCalifornia.xls. For a statistical
analysis of the Public Citizen data, see JosHuA M. FRANK, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
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Citizen analyzed outcomes in 33,948 NAF consumer arbitrations between
January 1, 2003 and March 31, 2007. The vast majority of cases were filed
by businesses against consumers; only 118 (0.35% of the cases) were
brought by consumers against businesses. 239
Findings: In the cases with consumer claimants, businesses prevailed in
sixty-one cases and consumers in thirty cases; in the remaining cases the
prevailing party was listed as "N/A." In 14,654 cases, no arbitrator was ever
appointed and the case was either settled or dismissed. In the 19,294 cases in
which an arbitrator was appointed, the business won in 18,091 (or 93.8%)-
most of which were resolved on the basis of documents only with the
consumer not appearing-while the consumer won in 781 (4.0%).240 Public
Citizen also provided information on the arbitrators who decided the cases:
twenty-eight arbitrators decided 89.5% of the cases in which an arbitrator
was appointed, with the busiest according to Public Citizen deciding sixty-
eight cases in a single day.241
Criticisms: Professor Peter B. Rutledge criticized Public Citizen's data
analysis on several grounds. First, the focus of the report was narrow,
addressing a single arbitration provider (NAF) and a single type of business
(consumer credit). 242 Second, the high win rate for businesses was due to the
type of claim involved - debt collection actions - which tend to have "very
little to dispute." 243 He notes: "Studies of debt collection actions in major
cities reveal that the lender typically wins between 96% and 99% of the time,
right in line with the lender win rate data cited in the Public Citizen
Report." 244 Rutledge also states that Public Citizen misinterpreted the NAF
data in estimating the number of cases decided by arbitrators in a single
day.245
LENDING, STACKED DECK: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FORCED ARBITRATION (May
2009), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/credit-cards/research-
analysis/stacked deck.pdf.
239 PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION TRAP, supra note 6, at 15.
240 Id
241 Id. at 16.
242 RUTLEDGE, GOOD DEAL, supra note 6, at 10.
243 Id. at 11.
244 Id
245 Id. at 11-12 ("This argument mischaracterizes the California data. Those data
include a field for the date of the award. The Public Citizen Report treats this listed date
as the day when the arbitrator actually rendered an award. This is incorrect. Rather, the
California data reflect the date that the award was entered into NAF's system. An
arbitrator may render a series of awards over several days, yet NAF enters those awards
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3. Mark Fellows, The Same Result as in Court, More Efficiently:
Comparing Arbitration and Court Litigation Outcomes, METRO. CORP.
COUNSEL, July 2006, at 32.
Sample: Mark Fellows of the National Arbitration Forum reported
information about NAF arbitrations from 2003-2004. The data was compiled
from disclosures made by NAF as required by California law.246
Findings: Fellows found that consumer claimants "prevail in 65.5% of
cases that reach a decision," while business claimants "prevail in 77.7% of
cases that reach a decision." The time from filing until disposition averaged
4.35 months for consumer claimants and 5.60 months for business claimants.
On average, consumer claimants paid $46.63 in arbitration fees while
business claimants paid $149.50 in arbitration fees.247
Criticisms: Public Citizen criticized Fellows' analysis on several
grounds. First, Fellows treats a business withdrawing a claim as a win for the
consumer. But "[t]hese claims are not comparable to judicial decisions after
bench trials.248 When only cases decided by an arbitrator are considered,
businesses prevail at a much higher rate. Second, Public Citizen was not able
to duplicate Fellows' estimate of consumer claimants' win rates, finding
instead that "consumers prevailed in only 37.2 percent of consumer-initiated
cases that reached a decision."249 Regardless, cases with consumer claimants
"account for a miniscule percentage of NAF arbitrations and therefore are not
representative of NAF arbitrations." 250
into its system in a single day.").
246 Fellows, supra note 25, at 32.
247 Id
248 PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP, supra note 6, at 9.
249 Id at 10.
250 Id.
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4. ERNST & YOUNG, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF CONSUMER LENDING CASES 16, App. A (2004), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/
2005ErnstAndYoung.pdf.251
Sample: 226 NAF arbitrations brought by consumers between January
2000 and January 2004.252 The study did not include information on
arbitrations brought by businesses.
Findings: The largest category of disputes involved credit card fees and
charges (38.9% of the cases), with other significant case types including
disputes over credit card chargebacks (8.4%), mortgage loans (8.4%), and
other loans (7.5%).253 The substantial majority of claims (73.0%) sought
$15,000 or less; only 7.0% of claims were for more than $75,000.254 Overall,
129 of the 226 cases (or 57.1%) were dismissed before hearing, either due to
settlement or on request of the plaintiff. Ernst & Young classified all but four
of those cases as cases in which the consumer prevailed.255 Of the cases that
reached a decision by the arbitrator, the consumer prevailed in fifty-three out
of ninety-seven cases (or 54.6%).256 Ernst and Young concluded:
"Consumers appear to be satisfied with settlements accomplished prior to
hearings and if a hearing takes place, consumers are not losing a
disproportionate number of cases. Therefore, the findings from this analysis
do not support claims that the arbitration process is harmful to
consumers." 257
251 See also supra text accompanying notes 229-31.
252 ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 27, at 7. Of the 250 casefiles provided by the NAF,
Ernst & Young excluded 24 employment-related cases from the study. Id. at 7.
253 Id. at 8.
254 Id
255 Id. at 9 ("Under the first measure, a claimant is said to prevail if the arbitration
decision favored the claimant, or if the case was dismissed at the claimant's request or
per party agreement. This measure assumes that the consumer was sufficiently satisfied
with the settlement to dismiss the arbitration proceedings."). The four dismissals in which
the consumer did not prevail, according to Ernst & Young, were ones in which either the
NAF dismissed the case due to some deficiency or the consumer dismissed the case
because he or she could not afford to continue. Id. at 9 n. 11.
256 Id. at 9.
257 Id. at 10. In addition to its case analysis, Ernst & Young surveyed twenty-nine of
the consumers involved in the cases (twenty-five of whom had prevailed in their cases).
Of those responding, twenty-five (or 69%) either "were satisfied or very satisfied with the
arbitration process." Id. at 11-12.
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Criticisms: Bland et al. have criticized the Ernst & Young study on
several grounds.258 First, the study examined only the arbitration process and
did not compare arbitration to litigation. Second, the study included
dismissals, whether by claimant request or party agreement, as wins by the
claimant. It also included any case in which a claimant prevailed, regardless
of the amount recovered, as a win. Third, the study focused only on the
claims filed by consumers, "disregarding more than 100,000 filed by
corporations against consumers during the same four-year period."259
5. CAL. DisP. RESOL. INST., CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: A REVIEW OF WEBSITE DATA POSTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 1281.96 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Aug.
2004), available at http://www.mediate.com/cdri/cdriprint-aug_6.pdf.
Sample: 2175 arbitration cases from January 2003 through February
2004, posted on websites of six different arbitration providers as required by
California law. The six providers were the AAA, ADR Services, Arbitration
Works, ARC Consumer Arbitrations, JAMS, and Judicate West.260 Although
the study included data on both consumer and employment arbitration, the
reported results did not distinguish between the two. 261
Findings: The CDRI prefaced its findings with the statement that "[i]n
general, inconsistencies, ambiguities and the lack of reported data in some
areas limit this study's utility for the purposes of informing policy."262 Data
on both filing and disposition dates were available for 1559 cases. For those
cases, the mean disposition time was 116 days, while the median was 104
days.263 The amount of arbitrator's fee was available for 1404 cases; the
mean fee was $2256 while the median fee was $870.264 The prevailing party
was identified for 302 cases. The consumer prevailed in 215 (or 71.2%) of
those cases, while the business prevailed in the remaining eighty-seven cases
258 F. PAUL BLAND JR. ET AL., CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:
ENFORCEABILITY AND OTHER Topics 11 (5th ed. 2007); see also PUBLIC CITIZEN,
ARBITRATION TRAP, supra note 6, at 20.
259 BLAND ET AL., supra note 258, at 11.
260 CALIFORNIA DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., supra note 28, at 14.
261 Id. at 22 fig.1.
262 Id. at 18. For a detailed description of the problems, see id. at 27-32.
263 Id. at 19.
264 Id. at 21.
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(or 28.8%).265 The amount of the award was reported for 540 cases; the mean
amount awarded was $33,112 while the median amount awarded was
$7615.266
Criticisms: Bland et al. identified the following criticisms of these
results. First, as the CDRI itself recognized, the data it was reviewing were
too incomplete to reach any firm conclusions. 267 Second, the study "appears
to exclude collection actions brought by creditors against consumers and any
arbitrations from the National Arbitration Forum, a lightning rod concerning
the fairness of consumer arbitration." 268
6. Answers and Objections of First USA Bank, N.A. to Plaintiffs
Second Set of Interrogatories, Ex. 1, Bownes v. First U.S.A. Bank, N.A. Civ.
Action No. 99-2479-PR (Ala. Circuit Ct. 2000), available at
http://www.publicjustice.net/Repository/Files/McQuillanExhibit_ 16-19.pdf.
Sample: Data on NAF arbitration outcomes between 1998 and 2000,
produced by First USA Bank in response to interrogatories in an Alabama
lawsuit.269
Findings: The data showed that of the 51,622 NAF arbitrations in which
First USA was involved with consumers, it prevailed in 19,618 while the
cardholder prevailed in eighty-seven. Of the cases in which First USA
prevailed, the substantial majority (17,293 of 19,618, or 88.1%) were cases
in which the consumer did not respond. Another 28,248 cases expired,
typically for failure to serve the cardholder within ninety days, and another
3666 were pending at the time the discovery response was made. Consumers
brought four cases against First USA, prevailing in two of the cases and
settling a third; the fourth was still pending.270 These results are commonly
cited as showing that "First USA prevailed in an astonishing 99.6 percent of
cases." 271
Criticisms: The NAF responded that collection cases in court have a
similar success rate for businesses ("creditors win about 98 percent of
265 Id. at 25.
266 Id. at 20.
267 BLAND ET AL., supra note 258, at 12; see also PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION
DEBATE TRAP, supra note 6, at I1-12.
268 BLAND ET AL., supra note 258, at 12.
269 First USA Interrogatory Answers, supra note 54, ex. 1.
270 Id. at 38, ex.1.
271 PUBLIC CITIZEN, ARBITRATION TRAP, supra note 6, at 13.
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collection actions brought against debtors in federal courts") and that
'"expired' cases should be counted as victories for consumers." 272
927
272 Caroline E. Mayer, Win Some, Lose Rarely? Arbitration Forum's Rulings Called
One-Sided, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2000, at E01 (quoting Ed Anderson, NAF managing
director).
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APPENDIX 2.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AND SECURITIES
ARBITRATION
This appendix lists empirical studies of employment and securities
arbitration, organized by type of arbitration and author name.
A. Employment Arbitration
Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and
After the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory
Disputes Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence that Self-
Regulation Makes a Diference, in ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53rd
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn
eds., 2004).
Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and
Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873 (2002).
Lisa B. Bingham, Unequal Bargaining Power: An Alternative Account
for the Repeat Player Effect in Employment Arbitration, IRRA 50th ANN.
PROC. 33 (1998).
Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use
of Statistics in Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEORGE L.
REV. 223 (1998).
Lisa B. Bingham, An Overview of Employment Arbitration in the United
States: Law, Public Policy and Data, N.Z. J. INDUS. REL., June 1998, at 5.
Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1
EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997).
Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment
Arbitration: A Look at Actual Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108 (1996).
Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Non-Union
Employment Disputes?, 6 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 369 (1995).
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Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration:
Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 405
(2007).
Alexander J.S. Colvin, Paper Presentation at 62nd Annual Conference on
Labor, New York University, Employment and Consumer Arbitration: What
Do the Data Show? (June 5, 2009).
Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights?,
DIsP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 56.
Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of
Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, DiSP. RESOL. J., Nov.
2003/Jan. 2004, at 44.
Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 559 (2001).
Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of
Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration
Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777 (2003).
Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost,
DisP. RESOL. J., May/July 2003, at 9.
William M. Howard, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes:
What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, DISP. RESOL. J.,
Oct./Dec. 1995, at 40..
William M. Howard, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Arbitration
Disputes: Can Justice Be Served? (May 1995) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Arizona State University).
Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38
U.S.F. L. REv. 105 (2003).
Lewis L. Maltby, The Myth of Second-Class Justice: Resolving
Employment Disputes in Arbitration, in HOW ADR WORKS 915 (Norman
Brand ed., 2002).
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Lewis L. Maltby, Arbitrating Employment Disputes: The Promise and
the Peril, in ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 530 (Daniel P.
O'Meara ed., 2002).
Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil
Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 (1998).
NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INST., EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: WHAT
DOES THE DATA SHOW?, available at
http://www.workrights.org/current/cdarbitration.html.
HOYT N. WHEELER, WORKPLACE JUSTICE WITHOUT UNIONS 47-68
(2004).
B. Securities Arbitration
Stephen B. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, & A.C. Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators
(Nov. 2008), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter
/papers/Choi attorneysfinal.pdf.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, How INVESTORS FARE, Rep. No.
GAO/GGD-92-74 (May 1992).
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES ARBITRATION: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO ADDRESS PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS, Rep. No.
GAO/GGD/00-1 15 (June 2000).
JIRO E. KONDO, SELF-REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN FINANCIAL
MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM INVESTOR-BROKER DISPUTES AT THE NASD
(Dec. 25, 2007).
EDWARD S. O'NEAL & DANIEL R. SOLIN, SECURITIES LITIG.&
CONSULTING GROUP, MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF SECURITIES DISPUTES:
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF How CLAIMANTS FARE (2007), available at
http://www.slcg.com/pdf/news/Mandatory/o20Arbitration%20Study.pdf
Michael A. Perino, Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission
Regarding Arbitrator Conflict Disclosure Requirements, in NASD AND
NYSE SECURITIES ARBITRATIONS 32-33 (Nov. 4, 2002).
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